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3 Abstract 
The Sino-ASEAN relations had its ups and downs in the past four decades but ever 
since the end of Cold War, it had been improving steadily and until the end of 2000s. A 
“Golden Decade” was brought up to describe the progress China and ASEAN gained. This 
paper explores the achievement of China and ASEAN in their relationship during the Golden 
Decade and how this could have potentially led China and ASEAN closer to a “Diamond 
Decade” in the coming years.  
This paper looks at four specific instances of the Sino-ASEAN relations in the Golden 
Decade, namely, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) negotiation, the macro 
Sino-ASEAN economic relationship, the macro security arrangement of ASEAN and the 
Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea. A series of analysis on these instances 
reflects that although the Sino-ASEAN relations has been progressing in the area of 
economic, the tension between China and ASEAN has persisted in the security arena.  
This paper argues that unless China transforms its diplomatic position on ASEAN, it 
is unlikely that the Sino-ASEAN relations will enter into a Diamond Decade. Due to the 
different concerns that ASEAN states have on their relationship with China, the likely 
consequence of the current Chinese foreign policy will divide ASEAN as a group, which will 
undermine an essential premise for a Diamond Decade to come, in which ASEAN should 
remain as an effective regional institution.  
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4 Introduction 
China and the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) enjoy a historical bond, geographical proximity, cultural affinity, and inextricable 
common interests. Mr Stanley Loh Ka Leung, Ambassador of Singapore to China, 
proclaimed the 10 years from 2003 when China and ASEAN forged a strategic partnership as 
the “Golden Decade”.1  
In the economic arena, both sides signed an initial framework of free trade agreement 
(CAFTA) in 2002. China also pushed forward special programmes for tariff reductions to 
promote trade with ASEAN states. Between 2003 and 2012, the volume of trade between 
China and ASEAN has increased by fivefold, whereas their two-way investment has 
expanded threefold.2  
On the security front, China has committed to complying with the principles of non-
aggression and non-interference in handling diplomatic relations with individual ASEAN 
states and ASEAN as a whole. The milestones in their security relationship include China’s 
reaffirmation to the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), as well 
as China’s formal accession, being the first non-ASEAN state, to the ASEAN's Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kun Zhai, "Renmin Ribao Guandian: Dazao Shenjiban [People's Daily Opinon: To Create 
an Update]," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], September 2 2013. 
2 Xiaoyan Zhou, "The 'Diamond' Decade," Beijing Review, September 19 2013. 
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Moreover, despite concerns that domestic policy options may be constrained by its 
foreign commitments, China has actively participated in the various ASEAN-led regional 
initiatives for security management and confidence building, including ASEAN + 1, 
ASEAN+ 3, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Vision Group, the ASEAN Senior 
Officials Meeting among others.  
China’s commitment to deepening the bilateral relations was further reaffirmed by 
Premier Li Keqiang at the 10th China-ASEAN Expo in 2013, where Li re-positioned the 
bilateral relationship as a community of common destiny and called for turning the next 10 
years into a "Diamond Decade”.3  
Putting the rhetoric aside, while the bilateral economic ties between China and 
ASEAN have proved to be rather successful, the same cannot be said for the security issues. 
Of particular note are the perceived “China Threat” stemming from China’s revolutionary 
policies in the 1960s and the prevailing maritime conflicts over the South China Sea.  
Undoubtedly, ASEAN has crafted a double track policy, which aims to engage China 
for economic benefits while seeking security protection from the United States to hedge 
against the risk of a dominated China. The situation has become more complicated due to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Kun Zhai, "Chinese Diplomacy Towards Southeast Asia in 2014,"  
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-diplomacy-towards-southeast-asia-in-
2014/. 
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“US pivot to Asia” policy initiated by the Obama administration since 2010, putting 
Southeast Asia as the locus of this rebalance strategy. 
As Obama noted in November 2012, it was not a coincidence for him to arrange his 
first international trip to the ASEAN countries immediately after winning the second term of 
Presidency4. Although the bilateral relationships for the next 10 years are still taking shape, 
as the past decade or so has unfolded, the Sino-ASEAN relations are indeed a mix of bilateral 
bellicosity, mutual understanding and cooperation.  
In order to give comments on whether there will be a “Diamond Decade” for the 
bilateral relations, this paper takes a reflective approach to study four different aspects of the 
Sino-ASEAN relations and to examine China’s past efforts to deepen the bilateral relations 
during the “Golden Decade”. The metric that this paper take to analyse whether the Diamond 
Decade is approaching is whether the Golden Decade had brought China and ASEAN closer 
in the area of economic cooperation and easing their scepticism on each other in the security 
arena.   
The first two parts of the paper will focus on the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(CAFTA) in two perspectives. It will first adopt a Constructivist view to unveil China’s 
political agenda behind its CAFTA proposal and to discuss whether China has achieved its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Xuetong Yan, "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement," The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014). 
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political goals. The second part will explore the possible economic benefits China has gained 
under this CAFTA framework and discuss whether it is mutually beneficial or it is turning to 
be in China’s favour. The conclusion will have a profound impact on ASEAN’s commitment 
towards the Sino-ASEAN economic ties in the long run.  
The paper will then discuss the bilateral relations in the security arena by reviewing 
China’s participation in the ASEAN-led multilateral organizations through different IR 
theories. Lastly, the paper will focus on the increasingly tense territorial disputes between 
China and ASEAN states in the South China Sea. By examining the conflicts between both 
sides in the past decade, one will be able to give some predictions on whether this region is 
hurtling towards an era of stability or expanded conflict.  
Given the increasing importance of the Southeast Asia region in global politics and 
the vast and dynamic opportunities for China, China’s growing attention to ASEAN is a 
reflection of the changing geostrategic realities. Meanwhile, the recent US rebalancing policy 
is moving the China-ASEAN relations towards a new face. Through a detailed analysis on 
the bilateral economic and security relations during the Golden Decade, this paper aims to 
examine the degree of influence of China on the actions and decisions made by ASEAN and 
provide valuable insights on the trends of China-ASEAN relations in the Diamond Decades.  
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5 CAFTA Negotiation 
5.1 Background 
The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is China’s first successful 
attempt in the 21st century at free trade arrangement. The idea originated from the then 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, as he addressed the 2000 ASEA+3 Summit in Singapore, “In 
the long term, China and the ASEAN countries can also further explore the establishment of a 
free trade relationship”. The formal proposal of CAFTA was made in 2001 and it was fully 
enacted in 2010. It is now the world’s largest FTA by population. Although there has long 
been a solid understanding in favour of free trade arrangements based on economic efficiency, 
China’s open push for the formation of CAFTA is rather politically driven. Three major facts 
stand out in assessing China’s commitment in the CAFTA negotiation 
First, the details of the CAFTA arrangement had not been fully discussed before its 
announcement. Only after Zhu Rongji’s speech, the ASEAN-China Expert Group was set up 
to study the feasibility of the proposal. The composition of the Chinese team also shed light 
on their focus. For instance, it only consisted of five Beijing-based scholars whose expertise 
is more on geo-political studies.5 China’s leading institutes for Southeast Asia Studies were 
all located in Southern China and they were not involved in the feasibility study until the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Lijun Sheng, "China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and Strategic 
Motivations," in ISEAS Working Paper: International Politics & Security Issues (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). 
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proposal had already been made. In other words, China’s professional Southeast Asian 
experts’ apparent support for the CAFTA framework was simply because the proposal had 
been formally announced.  
Second, given the fact that the economies of China and ASEAN are more competitive 
than complementary in terms of factor endowments, technology levels, export products and 
targeting markets, many Chinese experts suggested that China should first establish bilateral 
FTAs with individual ASEAN states before covering all ten states.6 However, Beijing 
rejected this recommendation and insisted that the negotiation should be made with ASEAN 
as a group to signal China’s recognition of ASEAN’s value as a collective entity.7  
Third, to ease ASEAN states’ concerns about the Chinese competition in their 
domestic markets, China has undertook a number of economic concessions, including the 
Early Harvest Programmes (EHP) that gave ASEAN a quick reduction of tariffs before China 
did likewise with the rest of the world. Moreover, China had also accorded the most favoured 
nation (MFN) status to ASEAN states that have not yet joined the WTO. In addition, China 
gave them an extra five years to comply with the CAFTA framework, which is a special and 
differential treatment. China’s goodwill is evident from the increased trade deficits between 
China and ASEAN before and after the CAFTA enactment. China’s trade deficit to ASEAN 
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7 Alice Ba, "China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia," Asian Survey 
43, no. 4 (2003). 
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went from USD 1.3 billion in 19938  to USD 4.8 billion in 2000.9It then increased again to 
USD 16.34 billion in 2010 with a further jump to USD 22.69 billion in 2011.10  
Why was China so enthusiastic to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement with 
ASEAN as a group, even at the expense of economic concessions? The following section will 
unveil China’s political agendas behind its promotion of CAFTA, so as to understand why 
CAFTA is considered as one of the four fundamental structural pillars of Sino-ASEAN 
relations. To begin with, a hypothesis with a Constructivist approach is established to 
examine the rationales behind China and ASEAN’s political choice. Building on the 
hypothesis, the paper will discuss to what extent China has achieved its political goals and the 
implications that the negotiation and implementation of CAFTA have brought to future Sino-
ASEAN relations.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Sheng, "China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and Strategic 
Motivations." 
9 Changwen Xu, "Shuangying Qianjing [a Win-Win Game],," Guoji Maoyi [International 
Trade] (Beijing), 12 (2001). 
10 Ningning Xu, "Xu Ningning Discusses About Trade and Investment Cooperation between 
China and ASEAN," China-ASEAN Business Council Chinese Secretariat 
http://www.smecorp.gov.my/vn2/sites/default/files/China-
ASEAN%20Business%20No46.pdf. 
13 
5.2 Constructivist Hypothesis 
Constructivists agree with Realists that anarchy, the absence of authority above, is the 
fundamental concern among all states in the international system. However, Constructivists 
believe that there is more than one understanding of anarchy, as the international system 
consists of multiple actors and they could all have different understandings of anarchy based 
on “…own communities of intersubjective understandings and practices.”11 Constructivists 
assume that norm, interest and identity are not unitary, and state interests are part of the 
process of identity construction through social practices. In this regard, a state’s behaviour or 
action is only meaningful within a specific intersubjective social context. Therefore, China’s 
decision to offer CAFTA must be read in the context of the Sino-ASEAN relations 
development, as well as China’s interest and identity building process in the context of Asia 
Pacific from the late 1990s to the early 2000s.  
 
5.2.1 The socialization between China and ASEAN 
In general, China’s perception towards ASEAN has evolved dramatically from 
confrontational in the 1960s to accommodating since the 1990s. Although history and 
geographic proximity would be good reasons for ASEAN to worry about China’s ambitions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hopf Ted, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 
International Security 23, no. 1 (2011). 
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in the region, ASEAN’s profound suspicions towards China only emerged after the 
foundation of the People’s Republic of China. During the Cold War, China’s revolutionary 
policies in the 1960s, in particular, its support of local communist movement and  
manipulation of overseas Chinese, had contributed a lot to a legacy of distrust among 
Southeast Asian states. However, the China-US rapprochement in the 1970s brought about 
profound changes to the regional context featuring western military retrenchment, and this 
motivated ASEAN states to reassess their relations with China. As Alice Ba suggests, as a 
result of the China-US rapprochement, ASEAN states started to take a more equidistant 
stance towards the great powers in the region.12 Therefore, Malaysia established diplomatic 
relations with China in 1974, followed by Thailand and Philippines in 1975. For Thailand, 
China has even transformed from a Cold War antagonist to their main protector.13 Singapore 
and Indonesia, although did not normalize their relationships with China in the 1990s, started 
to engage China  at official levels. Sino-ASEAN relations was further reinforced during 
Vietnam’s intervention and subsequent occupation of Cambodia, as both China and ASEAN 
opposed Vietnam’s aggression. At the same time, China’s reform policy had boosted China’s 
trade and economic ties with the region.  
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13 "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations," The Pacific 
Review 19, no. 2 (2006). 
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The end of Cold War has brought another pivot to the Sino-ASEAN relations. US 
commitment to the security arrangement with its allies in Southeast Asia dropped 
significantly at the time because of economic difficulties and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. ASEAN states were asked by the US to make trade and economic concessions so that 
the existing security arrangement could be maintained.14 Despite the importance of a 
continued US commitment to Southeast Asia, ASEAN had to explore alternate economic 
opportunities with other countries. In part due to this concern, ASEAN states remained silent 
during international sanctions against China after the Tiananmen Square Crackdown.  
Thereafter, ASEAN led a diplomatic campaign to engage rather than to isolate China. By 
1991, all ASEAN states have normalized their diplomatic relations with China. The 
enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the conclusion of the 
Europe’s Maastricht Treaty further intensified ASEAN’s concerns over their access to the US 
and European markets. In response, ASEAN explored the possibility of developing deeper 
ties with non-US regional great powers, including China, at both bilateral and multilateral 
levels. In particular, the emergence of the various ASEAN-led multilateral arrangements such 
as the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter?," World Politics 45 (1993). 
16 
China Sea Workshops. From 1989 to 1997, bilateral trade between China and many ASEAN 
states shot up to three folds or more.15  
Meanwhile, China felt that ASEAN’s engagement served its own interest. The 1989 
Tiananmen Crackdown reminded Beijing of its vulnerability to international criticism and 
isolation. As a response, Beijing reassured its neighbouring countries of its good neighbour 
policy, coined by Deng Xiaoping’s guidance of “hiding one’s capability and biding one’s 
time”, to serve domestic economic modernization by creating and maintaining a peaceful 
external environment.16 ASEAN became an important partner of China during this period not 
only because it offered potential economic investors, but also political allies to counter 
challenges from the US. As Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis state, the fact that ASEAN’s 
members are both economically dynamic and politically authoritarian, has provided 
legitimacy for China’s “alternative vision” of good politics based on “communitarian 
requirements of order over individual preferences of freedom.”17 For instance, both ASEAN 
and China agreed that trade should not be associated with human rights, a source of tension in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ba, "China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia." 
16 Shaun Breslin, "Understanding China's Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and 
Implications," International Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009). 
17 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy : Past, 
Present, and Future, Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000). 
17 
both of their bilateral relations with the US.18 Nevertheless, there are destabilizing factors in 
the Sino-ASEAN relationship. Of particular note was ASEAN’s concern over China’s 
increasing self-assertion in the South China Sea in the 1990s, for instance, the Philippines 
claimed that China had taken possession of Mischief Reef in 1995.19 However, China 
managed to ease the anxiety through a series of high-profile gestures, including recognition 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, bilateral accords with Malaysia and 
the Philippines on the islands, and willingness to discuss the Spratlys with ASEAN in a 
multilateral forum.20 After all, ASEAN was reassured that Beijing’s interest laid in creating a 
stable environment for its economic take-off. 
China’s participation in a series of ASEAN-led multilateral initiatives was significant 
to the Sino-ASEAN engagement during this period.  These include ASEAN+1 (ASEAN and 
China), ASEAN+3 (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea), the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), the ASEAN Vision Group, and the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting, among others. 
As David Shambaugh points out, China's increased involvement in these initiatives in the 
"ASEAN Way" of consensus building and group decision-making reflects China's evolving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ba, "China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia." 
19 Ibid. 
20 "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations." 
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recognition that these institutions are neither intrinsically hostile to China nor set on 
constraining it.21 
 To summarize, social practices between China and ASEAN states, since 1949 and 
particularly after the 1990s, has gradually made China recognise ASEAN as a strategic 
partner of common interest, for whom, China can make some fundamental compromises.22 
For this reason, contrary to the dictatorial posture taken by the International Monetary Fund 
and international creditors in response to the Asian Financial Crisis, China nonetheless acted 
responsibly by not devaluing its currency and by offering aid packages and low-interest loans 
to several Southeast Asian states, such as USD 1 billion to assist Thailand to maintain the 
stability of the Thai Baht.23  
 
5.3 The Building Process of CAFTA 
By the early 2000s, China and ASEAN were enjoying a constructive relationship that 
gradually erased a history of “widespread suspicion, painful memories, and lingering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 David L. Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International 
Security 29, no. 3 (2005). 
22 Gregory Chin and Richard Stubbs, "China, Regional Institution-Building and the China–
ASEAN Free Trade Area," Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 3 (2011). 
23 Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order." 
19 
tensions.”24 During this time, China focused on economic growth, and China’s economic and 
security interests in the region were best served by engagement and cooperation through 
bilateral relations with individual states and multilateral processes for a stable external 
environment.25 However, while ASEAN states were still recovering from the 1997 AFC, 
China’s immediate accession to the WTO was about to bring a second heavy blow to ASEAN 
states. For instance, World Bank studies suggested “the lower-income ASEAN economies 
were the ones most likely to be adversely affected by China’s WTO membership, particularly 
after the country quotas associated with the Multi-Fiber Arrangement were removed at the 
end of 2004.”26 At the same time, the collective political significance of ASEAN was being 
challenged.27 It was within this context that China offered the China-ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement to the ASEAN states, through which, they could enjoy an early entrance to 
China’s market with reduced tariffs before the lower rates were extended to other WTO 
members. China has two goals embedded within. The first was to reassure ASEAN states 
about China’s continued and long-term interest in a good Sino-ASEAN relations. The second 
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was to demonstrate China’s political and economic value as a partner, and its commitment to 
ASEAN, relative to the other great powers.  
ASEAN also considered this CAFTA initiative attractive. As Kerk Choo Ting, the 
then Deputy International Trade and Industry Minister of Malaysia said, “The FTA would 
allow for ASEAN to make early inroads into the China market through preferential import 
duties.”28 Moreover, as China becomes more developed, increasing complementary actions is 
expected between China and ASEAN states within this framework.29 Alice Ba also suggests 
that through the CAFTA, investors can invest in ASEAN countries to directly serve the 
Chinese market, a positive effect on investment increase in ASEAN.30 
However, coinciding with concerns from China’s ASEAN experts on the economic 
feasibility of the CAFTA framework despite the potential economic gains, ASEAN states 
were perturbed about China’s competition in their domestic markets and how the agreement 
would affect ASEAN’s less developed and non-WTO members. 
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China proposed a pragmatic way to deal with these concerns. Zhang Yunling, one of 
the five Chinese scholars in the ASEAN-China Expert Group, named this approach as the 
“CAFTA Way”.31 
There are two main aspects within the CAFTA Way. The first one is the Early 
Harvest Programme (EHP) and the second one is China’s special and differential treatment of 
new ASEAN members. Through the EHP, by reducing the tariffs of some products, ASEAN 
states can attain an early access to China’s huge domestic market prior to the enactment of 
CAFTA.32 It is widely agreed that China has made significant economic concessions through 
the EHP by limiting its own exports to ASEAN states as well as granting ASEAN states 
access to a huge market with lower tariffs as compared to other WTO members.33 Statistics 
showed that, before EHP, China had surplus in products listed in the EHP in most years from 
1992 to 2003. The situation was immediately reversed to deficit after the EHP’s 
commencement in 2004.34  
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The EHP received some positive feedback from ASEAN leaders who emphasized that 
this “showed that the Chinese government was mindful of their needs as developing 
countries.”35 China’s self-constrained Early Harvest Programme has put China in a 
particularly favourable position, which in return, accelerated the negotiation of the CAFTA.  
However, China’s most significant concession to the CAFTA negotiation process is 
the special and differential treatment it made to ASEAN’s new members at that time, 
including Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia36. Given their concerns about their 
products' disadvantage in terms of both quality and quantity, China accorded the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) status consistent with WTO rules and disciplines to all the non-
WTO member states. Moreover, different timetables of tariff reductions were also applied to 
Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, which granted them five extra years to comply with 
the CAFTA, in addition to the free technical and technology assistance from China.37 
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5.4 The Achievement 
As stated above, China’s proposal of CAFTA reaffirmed its commitment to a 
productive Sino-ASEAN relationship in the context of a new world order full of economic 
and political challenges. China considered its relations with ASEAN as a geostrategic mean 
of incorporating ASEAN states into China’s regional strategic design. First of all, it is 
noteworthy that different from the trade agreements with Japan and the US, the CAFTA was 
the only free trade initiative at the time offered to ASEAN as a group. This is considered as a 
welcoming gesture in which China reaffirmed its recognition of ASEAN as a collective entity 
when ASEAN is facing a survival crisis.38 As Sheng Lijun of Singapore’s Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies (ISAS) points out, China discussed a FTA with ten ASEAN 
members is significant in itself, as “it has found common interest to engage all the Southeast 
Asian countries constructively and exclusively to talk about cooperation.”39 The negotiation 
process itself is a process of confidence building. The slow but incremental negotiation meant 
that China has enjoyed a constructive relation with ASEAN for at least ten years.  
Secondly, according to Zhang Yunling, the CAFTA becomes more significant when it 
is placed in the context of the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation, a legal instrument to govern future Sino-ASEAN economic 
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cooperation. The CAFTA is only part of the Framework Agreement, but its establishment can 
promote the Sino-ASEAN economic cooperation to a new height of achievement. For 
example, China and ASEAN have agreed to extend the cooperation priorities to areas of 
agriculture, information and communication technology, human resource development, 
Mekong Basin development, investment, energy, transport, culture, public health, tourism 
and environment.40 The then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong once called for 
ASEAN to “ride on China’s growth.”41 As David Shambaugh argues, ASEAN states 
gradually realize that China's rise is inevitable, and the best strategy for ASEAN to hedge 
against the risk of China’s disruptive behaviour is to entangle the dragon in as many ways as 
possible42. 
Thirdly, as the institution building of the CAFTA goes further, the economic 
interdependence between China and ASEAN will be further strengthened. Chinese trade and 
investment are increasingly becoming the economic growth engine for ASEAN states, which 
offsets the declining regional economic influence of the US and Japan. The increased 
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economic ties also give ASEAN huge stakes in China’s growth and stability, contributing to a 
favourable external environment for China’s economic development. As Dai Bingguo argues, 
China’s peaceful development is to create a peaceful and stable international environment for 
its development, and to run itself well is the most important fulfilment of China’s 
international responsibility. In other words, China’s peaceful development in itself is 
unconditional43, which helps transform the perception of “China Threat” into “China 
Opportunity”.44 
 
5.5 Problems and Challenges 
However, the benefits of the CAFTA should not be overestimated. A joint report from 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Asian Development Bank shows that “the 
extent and durability of regional production networks” under the CAFTA framework is not 
good enough. The utilization rate of the CAFTA from the Chinese side is 29.6% only, and 
trades are mainly in terms of manufactured goods, triggering the anxiety of the bilateral 
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relations within the CAFTA framework for being competitive rather than complementary in 
nature.45  
Indeed, since the CAFTA took full effect in 2010, the trade balance between China 
and ASEAN in certain areas has gradually turned to be in China’s favour. A recent report by 
the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission reveals that ASEAN’s trade in 
goods with China has gone from a surplus to a deficit in 2013. Since trade balance in favour 
of China was a political issue to both China and ASEAN when they formulated the CAFTA 
framework, the current trade imbalance has to be highlighted as a priority to fix. Indeed, 
some ASEAN states are even more concerned nowadays as the so-called mutually beneficial 
economic collaboration between China and ASEAN may turn to be in China’s favour, 
resulting in exporting China’s domestic problems, such as environmental degradation to 
ASEAN states.46 Of particular note is that some ASEAN states, on the fear of a China-centric 
regional economic order, have been playing a double-track strategy, in which they engage 
China for economic development, while approaching the United States for security purposes. 
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In other words, the economic benefits brought by the CAFT have not contributed to a spill 
over effect as expected by China to mitigate the profound US influence in the regional 
security arena. However, as Alice Ba suggests, this double-track strategy is not stable, and 
many countries are concerned that they may have to take side between the two great 
powers.47 
Besides economic reasons, the ineffectiveness of the CAFTA is largely attributed to 
the changing context in the region. A noteworthy change comes from China’s leadership 
transition. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he has proposed some new thinking in 
China’s regional diplomacy, namely, building a community of common destiny by the 
principles of amity, sincerity, and reciprocity and inclusiveness.48 On the one hand, ASEAN 
states are not sure of what this community of common destiny really means to them. On the 
other hand, China’s official rhetoric implies China’s departure from Hu Jintao’s 
unconditional peaceful development argument. According to Liu Zhenmin, Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Xi’s idea showcased China’s efforts to play a leadership role by providing a 
Chinese solution with Chinese wisdom to address common challenges to achieve 
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development and stability,49 which also implied that China is pursuing a Sino-centric regional 
order. Moreover, along with China’s economic growth, the scope of China’s national interest 
has been expanding, which include China’s huge investment overseas50 and its sovereignty 
claims over disputed areas. The increasingly complication among China’s different political 
agenda, for instance, its investments in Vietnam on the one hand and its disputed sovereignty 
claim on the South China Sea with Vietnam, may contribute to an impression of China’s “talk 
and take” strategy in the region.  
Another factor that has changed the regional context significantly is the US pivot to 
Asia after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). China and ASEAN relationship enjoyed a 
phenomenal development during US’s relative absence from Asia, particularly at the time of 
the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It provided a so-called “strategic opportunity” for China 
to expand its regional influence in Asia and an environment conducive to its domestic 
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development.51 However, the “US Pivot to Asia” strategy in 2010 has substantially changed 
China’s external strategic environment. The US high profile gestures in Southeast Asia, such 
as signing a ten years defence pact with the Philippines, has been regarded by China as 
infringing its territorial integrity and strategic interests.52 As a response, China has proposed 
the “New Model of Big Power Relations” in terms of no conflict or confrontation, mutual 
respect, and win–win cooperation as the basis of the Sino-US Relations.53 However, the US 
officials have been reluctant to use the term to describe the Sino-US Relations, signalling 
their rejection to China’s wishful thinking. 54   
Given the significant change in regional context and China’s expanding national 
interest, the CAFTA will no longer serve the same purpose as it did years ago until the new 
insights of regional context are included into the framework.  
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 6 Sino-ASEAN Economic Relations 
6.1 Sino-ASEAN Economic Relations 
China’s economy has been growing rapidly since the enactment of its open-door 
policy in 1979 and its continuing efforts to reform and develop its economy. However, only a 
few of China’s economic relations have evolved as much as that between China and ASEAN 
in the past decade.  
The establishment of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) is no doubt the most 
significant achievement among the various aspects of the Sino-ASEAN Economic Relations. 
The idea of forming CAFTA was initially proposed by China in 2000. The then-China 
Premier Zhu Rongji said "the ever-closer economic cooperation and trade between China and 
ASEAN make it necessary for both sides to further facilitate unfettered exchange of goods, 
technologies, capital and information", according to Zhu’s speech at a private meeting with 
ASEAN leaders.1 As a result of the CAFTA, China has become ASEAN’s largest trading 
partner since 2009. In 2014, the CAFTA was estimated to cover a population of 1.9 billion 
and trade volume between China and ASEAN was recorded at USD 480.39 billion. Both 
sides recently targeted to push up their bilateral trade volume to USD 500 billion by 2015 and 
USD 1 trillion by 2020.2  
In terms of investment, Japan remains prominent as the second largest foreign 
investor in ASEAN, accouting for 15.3% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) of ASEAN 
from 2012 to 2014. However, Japan’s invesment position in ASEAN will be greatly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Richardson, "Asian Leaders Cautious on Forging New Regional Partnership," The 
New York Times 2000. 
2 "ASEAN, China Reaffirm Commitment to Strategic Partnership," news release, June 8 2015, 
http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-china-reaffirm-commitment-
to-strategic-partnership. 
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challenged by China in the next decades. Since China realizes that in order to bring up the 
Sino-ASEAN bilateral trade volume to a new height, Southeast Asian region needs better 
infrastructures such as railways and container terminal. While China is now the fifth largest 
investor in ASEAN with net FDI inflows to ASEAN reaching USD 8.87 billion in 2014, 
representing 6.5% of ASEAN’s total FDI net inflows,3 it has proposed new economic 
diplomacies in 2014/2015, such as the Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) to expand its investments in ASEAN states.  
Although economic cooperation will remain as the cornerstone of the Sino-ASEAN 
relations in the foreseeable future, and economic initiatives have benefited both China and 
ASEAN in the past decade, there are still concerns over the Sino-ASEAN Economic 
Relations, especially from the ASEAN side, such as ASEAN’s increased economic reliance 
on China and the internal competition among ASEAN states for the economic benefits 
associated with the Sino-ASEAN Economic Relations.  
As part of this paper, this section will provide critiques from an economic perspective 
on whether China has strategically gained economic influence over ASEAN.  
 
6.2 Economic Factors Driving China to the CAFTA Negotiation 
Apart from the revision of China’s neighbouring policy in the 1990s, which has been 
explored in details in the previous section, two other factors that are more economically 
oriented have also led China to the CAFTA negotiation. They are the needs to develop trade-
negotiation skills and to balance Japan’s growing influence in the Southeast Asian region. 
For the former, this came up when China was negotiating for its accession to WTO. 
China had studied the experiences of the US, Canada, Australia, Japan and some other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 "Foreign Direct Investment Statistics,"  (ASEAN). 
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European countries in building regional economic and trade integrations. China saw the 
values to initiate FTA negotiation with ASEAN so as to develop their trade-negotiation skills.  
Therefore, instead of negotiating with comparatively more advance neighbouring economies 
like South Korea and Japan, China considered ASEAN as a lower risk option being the first 
partner in establishing a FTA. In hindsight, it is indeed true that China has become more 
confident to make similar FTA initiatives in both Asia and non-Asian countries. Since the 
establishment of the CAFTA, China has concluded another 13 FTAs comprising of 22 
economies, including Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Hong Kong, Macau, 
Costa Rica, Iceland, and Switzerland. It is now in the progress of negotiating the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with an even greater coverage than CAFTA.4 
For the latter, China noted that when Japan became an international economic and 
financial power in 1980s, Japan leveraged its official development assistance (ODA) to 
promote outward investments on ASEAN’s infrastructures, such as highways, power plants, 
container terminals, which have significantly contributed to the modernization of various 
Southeast Asian states. For instance, Japan’s ODA has contributed to “…20 percent of 
[Indonesia’s] national power generation, 30 percent of [Indonesia’s’] dams, 20 percent of 
Jakarta’s highway network, and two out of four top ranking [Indonesia’s’] hospitals….”.5 
However, Japan’s decision to devalue its currency against the US dollar to maintain the 
competitiveness of its exports, two years prior to the Asia Financial Crisis (AFC), received 
server criticism among ASEAN’s leaders. In contrast, China won applause from ASEAN by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 "China FTA Network," Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/list/rcepen/enrcepnews/1/encateinfo.html. 
5 Amy Thernstrom, "Japanese ODA at 50: An Assessment," in Asia Program Special Report 
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005). 
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keeping its currency stable during the AFC. The positive image that China gained from the 
AFC, as argued, has allowed China to reassess its policy towards ASEAN states and advance 
itself as the new leader of the region.6 
 
6.3 China Conceding with Early Harvest Programme? 
At the beginning of the CAFTA negotiations, China took a high-risk approach by 
announcing its desire to conclude a FTA with ASEAN states as a whole. Since the then-
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji articulated his wish of forming a CAFTA as soon as possible, 
China’s trade officials were under pressure to come to the negotiation table. During the 
CAFTA negotiation, it was true that China had made more concessions, such as allowing 
ASEAN to negotiate collectively rather than bilaterally and tailoring special economic 
concessions for each Southeast Asian economy. As mentioned previously, the EHP is one of 
the key CAFTA way’s policies adopted by China, with the aim to accelerate the conclusion 
and implementation of CAFTA by reducing China’s tariffs on some 600 products from 
various ASEAN states, in particular, agricultural products, so that ASEAN states can access 
China’s market prior to the establishment of the CAFTA. China’s trade negotiators explained 
that they were guided by the slogan “Giving six, taking four” in the CAFTA negotiations.7  
The total value of trade between ASEAN and China in the first seven months after the EHP 
took effect on 1 January 2004 reached USD 1.11 billion, representing an increase of 42.3% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Chin and Stubbs, "China, Regional Institution-Building and the China–ASEAN Free Trade 
Area," 277-98. 
7 Ibid. 
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over the same period of 2003.8 As a result of the EHP, the trade deficits of China with 
ASEAN grew substantially from 2004 to 2008 (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 - China's Balance of Trade with ASEAN 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
However, China had adjusted its trade position quickly since 2008 as most ASEAN 
tariffs on Chinese products were gradually reduced to zero when approaching 2010. 
Therefore, the economic benefits for ASEAN states enjoyed from the EHP is rather 
temporarily despite the fact that ASEAN exports has an “upper hand” in entering China’s 
domestic market. In this regards, it is argue that ASEAN states have only obtained limited 
strategic advantages from the EHP. However, China has archived its goal to fast track the 
CAFTA negotiation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Raul L. Cordenillo, "The Economic Benefits to ASEAN of the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
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Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, ASEAN states have been increasingly relying on 
China in trade. The share of ASEAN’s exports to China increased from 4.8% of ASEAN’s 
total export in 2002 (when CAFTA was signed) to 11.5% in 2011. In comparison, the share of 
China’s exports to ASEAN has been somehow “maintaining” at around 7% of China’s total 
export throughout the same period. This demonstrates that China’s market is becoming a 
major engine for ASEAN’s economy but not vice versa.  
Therefore, China is slowly gaining an upper hand over the ASEAN states in the 
economic arena, although China conceded in the earlier stage of the Sino-ASEAN economic 
integration as part of their negotiation strategy.  
 
Figure 2 - Comparative Proportion of Exports between China and ASEAN (in % of Export) 
 
Source: ASEAN Statistics 
 
6.4 Is Japan Losing Out? 
One of the most interesting and important interactions in the Sino-ASEAN Economic 
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Relations is the competition between China and Japan for their economic influences over 
ASEAN. In October 2013, leveraging the absence of President Obama from the APEC and 
East Asian Summit, China’s leaders attempted to increase China’s influence over ASEAN 
states in a pragmatic ways. In a speech made by China's President Xi Jinping in the APEC 
Summit, he tried to alleviate fears concerning China’s economic downturn,9 while at the East 
Asian Summit, China’s Premier Li Keqiang has called ASEAN states to focus less on the 
South China Sea Dispute but more on economic cooperation with China.10  
Unlike China’s focus on the economic diplomacy, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
who attended the East Asian Summit, chose to promote the China threat. Abe suggested that 
the South China Sea dispute was a matter of concern to the regional status quo.11 The 
interactions above showed that Japan and China are competing for greater influence in the 
Southeast Asian region. China will continue to promote trade and investment to enhance its 
economic influence over ASEAN, while Japan seems to have limited economic policies 
towards ASEAN and has to use the China threat to contain the rise of China in the region. 
The CAFTA serves as an important policy tool for China to compete for influence 
over Southeast Asian states with Japan. For instance, although Japan has also concluded its 
FTA with ASEAN states in 2008, the economic interdependence between Japan and ASEAN 
that the JAFTA created is incomparable with the CAFTA. As depicted in Figure 3, there is no 
significant change in Japan’s exports to ASEAN despite the conclusion of the JAFTA in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Anne Gearan, "China Capitalises on Obama's Absence to Press Business Case at Asia 
Summit," The Guardian, October 15 2013. 
10 "China Focuses on Regional Cooperation," China Daily, October 9 2013. 
11 Bandar Seri Begawan, "U.S., Japan Press China on South China Sea Dispute," Reuters, 
October 9 2013. 
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2008. In contrast, Japan’s exports to ASEAN fell by 14.2% in 2013, while China’s exports to 
ASEAN stood at an average growth rate of 16.3% between 2010 and 2013. In 2013, China’s 
total export to ASEAN is 1.7 times larger than Japan. Therefore, in terms of trade connection, 
Japan is no longer in a position to challenge the influence of China in the region. 
 
Figure 3 – China and Japan Exports to ASEAN 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Nevertheless, Japan remains as the second largest foreign investor (or biggest single 
foreign country) in ASEAN, accouting for 15.3% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) of 
ASEAN from 2012 to 2014. China is the 5th biggest foreign investor, and if Hong Kong is 
included, the “China plus Hong Kong” would be the third largest foreign investor in ASEAN, 
representing 13.5% of ASEAN’s total investment inflows in 2014, which is much closer to 
Japan’s 17.9%. 
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Figure – 4 Top Ten Sources of FDI inflows in ASEAN 
 
Source: ASEAN Statistics 
 
Going forward, China’s economic focus in ASEAN would be investment. As 
mentioned, the idea of Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) is to serve as the major economic diplomacy of China to expand its investments in the 
developing world, and ASEAN is certainly a major area that it will focus on.  
The Maritime Silk Road, also known as the “21st Century Maritime Silk Route 
Economic Belt”, was first proposed by Xi during a speech to Indonesian Parliament in 
October 2013. Since China wishes to bring the trade relations with ASEAN to a new level (1 
trillion by 2020), it is necessary for ASEAN states to have better infrastructures to facilitate 
better access to trades and people-to-people links between China and the 10 ASEAN states.  
For ASEAN, it realizes the need to improve intra-connectivity among its 10 members, 
and it has articulated the ASEAN Mater Plan for Connectivity with 15 projects specifically 
identified in the area of railway, boarder control, communications, etc. Several high-level 
discussions and technical working group meetings have been held since the plan was 
announced in 2009. The ASEAN Master Plan for Connectivity is part of the policy agenda of 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). AEC sets the goal of regional economic integration 
by 2015 with the following key characteristics: a single market and production base; a highly 
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competitive economic region; a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully 
integrated into the global economy.12  
The Asian Development Bank and the Japanese ODA have already engaged in the 
ASEAN Master Plan for Connectivity, but there is still ample scope for AIIB, the Maritime 
Silk Road, the China’s Silk Road Fund, as well as Chinese ODA. Some signs show that the 
momentum for the China-ASEAN cooperation in realizing the master plan is growing, and 
China is rapidly catching up Japan in infrastructure investments.13 For instance, the 
convergence of the 7,000 km Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) with the ASEAN’s 
railway connectivity plans; the recent deal between Thailand and China to jointly construct 
the Thai section of the route. If completed, the SKRL will link Kunming, the capital of 
China’s Yunnan province, with all the capitals of mainland ASEAN countries (except 
Malaysia, since the line will bypass Kuala Lumpur on its way to Singapore) .14 In many 
infrastructure projects such as ports, terminals and high-speed railway, China can offer the 
technology and expertise to support the ASEAN’s master plan.  
The China-led AIIB also made good progress in establishing the bank in 2014/2015, 
with 57 founding members and most European economies included, which shows a sign of 
confidence over China’s motivation to invest in infrastructure development and the possible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12"ASEAN Economic Community,"  (ASEAN).  
13 Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, "ASEAN Connectivity and China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’," The 
Diplomat, March 26 2015. 
14 "Singapore-Kunming Rail Link Project to Sync with Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity," news release, August 12, 2011, http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-
news/item/singapore-kunming-rail-link-project-to-sync-with-master-plan-on-asean-
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economic benefits that it can generated with their capitals. AIIB is scheduled to launch by the 
end of 2015 and project pipeline development will begin in late 2015. According to China’s 
Finance Ministry, China will hold a 30.34% stake, making it the largest shareholder of AIIB. 
This would give China 26.06% of the voting power within this multilateral institution. In 
comparison, Asian Development Bank (ADB) has a total of 48 members and Japan held only 
15.7% stake with 12.8% of the voting power as of 31 December 2014.15 
In this context, China has a relatively good control over AIIB compared to Japan in 
ADB, and Japan and US are not even intended to be the members of AIIB. China’s ambition 
in building hardware in Southeast Asia countries will enable China to win not only 
investments, but also to support the already strong trade growth and ultimately consolidate 
China’s economic influence in this region. 
In response, Japan has pledged JPY 2 trillion of ODA to ASEAN states in bid to dilute 
China’s influence in the region. Abe made the offer to ASEAN states during the Japan-
ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2013.  He also visited all ASEAN countries at least once 
in the first two years since he came to power, and he is keen to garner support for the view 
that Beijing’s behaviour is aggressive and coercive. At the Commemorative Summit, Abe said 
"together with ASEAN, I want to build the future of Asia where laws, rather than power, rule 
and people who worked hard will be rewarded - which would lead to a prosperous society 
with mutual respect".16  
Japan’s new initiatives in Southeast Asia in response to China’s increasing economic 
influence (in trade and investment) provide both opportunities and challenges to ASEAN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 "ADB's Shareholders,"  (Asian Development Bank, 2014). 
16 "Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit (Japan’s ODA to ASEAN),"  (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013). 
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states. However, the worst-case scenario is that ASEAN will be divided into pro-China 
members and pro-Japan/US camp. 
 
6.5 A Shift from Complementing to Competing? 
A key debate for economic integration such as FTA is whether one country’s exports 
are complementary with another country’s import structure. It is possible for competing 
economies to implement FTA, but those economies would eventually transform themselves 
and become complementary to each other. Classic trade theorists have argued that countries 
may have produced similar goods prior to FTA implementation but when trade barriers are 
reduced under FTA, products produced by the more efficient firms would prevail and the 
number of similar products will reduce in the long run.17  
According to Estrada, the trade patterns of China and ASEAN were more 
complementary compared to China-Japan’s and China-South Korea’s. In particular, the 
complementarity index between China’s exports and ASEAN’s imports was approximately 
80% between 2006 and 2008.18 In addition, the rapid urbanization process as well as the rise 
of middle-class families in China will change the consumer behaviour and stimulate the 
imports of certain products. The proportion of total Chinese population living in urban areas 
has increased from 26% in 1990 to 54.7% in 2014, and it will make China an important new 
consumer market for ASEAN states in the coming decades.19 
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However, a recent study shows that including China into the regional economic 
integration through the CAFTA has created not only opportunities but also challenges to 
ASEAN states. In particular, agricultural raw material from Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia 
were identified to have the highest degree of similarity and this may causes a potential 
headwind for the concept of ASEAN Economic Community but the impact on the overall 
China-ASEAN economic relations would be limited. 20 
 
6.6 Hong Kong-ASEAN FTA Further Enhances CAFTA 
Speaking on the sidelines of an ASEAN summit on 27 May 2015, Hong Kong’s Chief 
Executive CY Leung announced that Hong Kong was expected to sign a FTA with ASEAN 
by 2016. Leung said “Hong Kong could act an important intermediary to facilitate trade and 
economic activities between ASEAN and China for mutual benefit.” Moreover, Leung noted 
that currently 12% of total trade between Malaysia and China were settled via Hong Kong.21 
A study conducted by Itakura, Fukunaga and Isono in 2013 suggests that HK-ASEAN FTA 
could generate considerable export volume increase between ASEAN and China by using a 
set of global computable general equilibrium simulations to evaluate economic effects of 
Hong Kong’s accession to the CAFTA. Under their estimation, trade between ASEAN and 
China will increase by USD 58 billion by 2020 as benefit from the HK-ASEAN FTA.  
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 7 AEAN – China Security Community  
7.1 Literature Review 
Realists assume that nation states are the key actors in the international system, and 
under Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism, states would act offensively to maximize their 
relative power to survive in this anarchic world.1 In such a world, states would have to rely 
on their own capabilities in their struggle for survival and as such, Realists dismiss the idea 
that international cooperation could stabilize the international system. They believe that shifts 
in the distribution of power, such as from bipolarity to multipolarity, would produce new 
security threats and provoke external alliances that may disturb the existing order. In face of a 
rising external power, the insecurities generated by rising powers may cause states to loosen 
their cooperation2 and states would instead undertake the strategies of appeasement, 
bandwagoning, balancing or hedging to overcome the emerging threat.  
Mearsheimer argues that appeasement is a strategy of yielding to a revisionist or an 
aggressive state and to encourage them to become more pacific and possibly, into a status quo 
power.3 It assumes that an appeased rising power would embrace the existing order and less 
likely to use military forces to challenge the existing order. Mearsheimer dismisses this 
strategy and contends that appeasement “is likely to whet, not to shrink aggressor state’s 
appetite for conquest.”4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 45, 
140-42. 
2 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the 
Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2003), 36. 
3 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 402. 
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Meanwhile, bandwagoning has two different associations with threats. As defined by 
Waltz in the balance-of-power theory, bandwagoning involves joining “forces with a more 
powerful opponent” and to share some of the spoils with the ascendant power.5 On the other 
hand, in the balance-of-threat theory, bandwagoning is defined as “aligning with the source 
of danger.”6 
In terms of balancing, Schweller describes it as “opposing the stronger or more 
threatening side in a conflict.7 Supporters of this strategy believe that effective balancing 
against an aggressive state will help to limit their ambitions and deter them from launching 
wars to revise the existing international order. There are two forms of balancing strategy: 
internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing refers to a state’s action to 
enhance its own military capabilities to counter any advisories. Meanwhile, external 
balancing refers to a state forming an alliance with other states to balance against a threating 
state.8  
However, one major weakness of internal balancing is the problem of security 
dilemma. Robert Jervis suggested that security dilemma exists when a state tries to increase 
its security, which in turn decreases the security of others. When many of the means by which 
the other state feels insecure, it increases its military expansion to increase security. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Shifting Strategy Towards the Rise of China," The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5 (2007): 740. 
6 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 81. 
7 Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 9. 
8 Mochizuki, "Japan's Shifting Strategy Towards the Rise of China," 741. 
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poses a danger of a spiralling effect of military build-up.9 Therefore, failure between states to 
reconcile their interests would have negative consequences.  
Another influential argument proposed by Realists is hedging. Jerdén and Hagstöm 
have defined hedging as a strategy that gives equal weight to economic and military 
security.10 Disputed by Stephen Walt, who thinks that geography, capability and intension of 
the adversary can be used to assess the degree of threats,11 in which a state may hedge with 
its allies against security threats while hedging with other countries against economic dangers. 
Hedging shares the same argument with balancing. When the hedging strategy intensifies, it 
may turn into balancing against an aggressive power.  
 
7.2 ASEAN Security Community 
This part of the paper will look at the ASEAN Security Community building 
mechanism and its impact on China, whether succeeded or failed to engage, balance against, 
hedge or contain China. The discussions reflect that Realism remains as the most prevailing 
argument in the Sino-ASEAN Security relations. Meanwhile, the increasing military 
spending among China and ASEAN states supports the core assumption of defensive realism, 
where security dilemma occurs and hinders peaceful engagement.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 
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10 Björn Jerdén and Linus Hagström, "Rethinking Japan's China Policy: Japan as an 
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The ASEAN Security Community is a framework to facilitate political and security 
cooperation within ASEAN members. Deutsch defined a security community as a group that 
has “become integrated”, where integration refers to the attainment of a sense of community, 
accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices to pledge for peaceful changes 
among members of a group with “reasonable” certainty over a “long period of time”.12 In fact, 
the moves by ASEAN to promote security were passive. At first, ASEAN wanted to remain 
on economic grounds. However, the founding members gradually realized the importance of 
interrelationship between economic and security issues. As former Thailand Foreign Minister 
recalled, “International realities forced ASEAN to deviate from its original path”.13 
It is important to understand ASEAN’s norms and principles before examining the 
effectiveness of building a security community in response to an increasing assertive China. 
They are the non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes, regional autonomy or 
regional solutions to regional problem, the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs of 
member states, and no military pacts and preference for bilateral cooperation. The founding 
Bangkok Declaration of 1967 outlined the ASEAN’s objective of promoting “regional peace 
and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of the law in the relationship 
among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.”14 The foundation of these ASEAN norms were also mentioned in the 1971 Kuala 
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Lumpur Declaration, where among them, “abstention from threat or use of force” and 
“peaceful settlement of international disputes” were stressed with specific reference to the 
principles of the UN Charter.15 
 
7.3 The “ASEAN Way”  
There is no official definition for the “ASEAN Way”. The origin of the term is also 
obscure. It is a term used by ASEAN’s leaders to distinguish themselves from other 
institutions and multilateral organisations from the West, and to describe the process of intra-
mural interactions. Consisting a high degree of consultation and consensus building, the 
ASEAN Way is a claim about the process, which often contrasted with the adversarial 
posturing, majority voting and other legalistic decision-making procedures in Western 
multilateral negotiation. The Singaporean foreign minister had described the ASEAN Way in 
1997 as the ‘[n]on-interference in the affairs of another country was…the key factor as to 
why no military conflict had broken out between any two member states since 1967’.16 
Among the four norms, ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference was an important part 
for members to achieve collective commitment between different regime systems, in 
particular, when against the communist rebellion. The signing of the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord in 1976 at the Bali Summit approved the “continuation of cooperation on a non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 "1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration,"  (ASEAN, 1971). 
16 Brendan Pereira, "ASEAN Can’t Condone Use of Force: Jaya," The Straits Times, July 25 
1997. 
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ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters and in accordance with their 
mutual needs and interests”.17  
The “ASEAN Way” provided both satisfactions and drawbacks in promoting security 
between China and ASEAN. On one hand, a high degree of consultation and consensus 
building can provide a basis for mutual understanding and security building with China. One 
the other hand, it gives too much flexibility and rooms for China to resist the engagement. 
The following part of this section will examine three major security initiatives 
proposed by ASEAN as well as assess their effects to ensure peace and stability in Southeast 
Asia. The three security initiatives are, The Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Treaty on the 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).  
 
7.3.1 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971) 
The ZOPFAN Declaration was a classic example of the ASEAN Way of consensus 
building, a softer and more open-ended framework, which emerged on 27 November 1971 
from a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur. The Declaration was signed 
by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The ZOPFAN Declaration 
committed all the ASEAN Member states to "exert initially necessary efforts to secure the 
recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, 
free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers, such as the US, the USSR, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the Problem of 
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and PRC."18 Moreover, it called on all of Southeast Asian states to "make concerted efforts to 
broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and 
closer relationship."19 
The Declaration was advocated by Malaysia in face of both domestic and external 
turbulence. Domestically, the racial conflict in May 1969 heightened the tension between the 
Chinese community and the Malaysian community. As realists would predict, perception is 
one of the immediate causes of state’s actions. Therefore, Malaysia’s perceived threat from 
China had led to its proposal of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 
Southeast Asia. Malaysian leaders feared that the pro-China Malaysian Chinese would be 
exploited by Beijing and this fear was intensified by China’s admission to the United Nations 
in 1971. In addition, the ZOPFAN Declaration initiative reflected the declining presence of 
external powers, such as the United States and the United Kingdom in the region, which 
could be explained by the fear of entrapment and abandonment. Under these circumstances, 
they have proposed a solution of ‘neutralisation’ of Southeast Asia as a means to limit 
China’s influence in the region.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 "Joint Press Statement Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Issue the Declaration 
of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality," news release, November 25, 1971, 
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19 Ibid. 
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However, there was no consensus reached for the ZOPFAN due to several reasons. 
Intra-ASEAN divergence on ZOPFAN was evident, especially at the early time of ASEAN 
formation. The fundamental impediment was the tensions between member’s quest for 
security autonomy and continued dependency on external power for security defence. In 
particular, although both Malaysia and Indonesia perceived China to be stronger than the 
other ASEAN members, they had taken a diverged path in dealing with the stronger China. 
Seeing the potential of China to become a security threat for the region, Malaysia took the 
initiative to appease China by moving towards a normalized relationship since 1974. In 
contrary, Indonesia remained concerned about the consequences of the neutralisation, which 
would likely increase, rather than decrease Chinese subversion in the region.21  
ZOPFAN was further undermined by ASEAN’s post-Cold War shift to a more 
engaging attitude towards external powers. The ZOPFAN Declaration seemed to have 
separated the ASEAN community with the outside world and rejected interactions and 
interests of external powers, which was impossible in real practices. The relevance of the 
Declaration had gradually declined after post-Cold War period. Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia moved away from ZOPFAN, while Malaysia later promoted another treaty in 1976 
at the Bali summit to deal with external interference and subversion.  
 
7.3.2 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (1976) 
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) was one of the 
measures to contribute to the realisation of ZOPFAN’s objects. The Treaty was concluded at 
the First ASEAN Summit on 24 February 1976, stipulated the peaceful settlement of all intra-
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regional disputes as part of ASEAN’s political cooperation. The purpose of this Treaty is “to 
promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which 
would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.”22 
In essence, the TAC meant to enhance the capacities of member states to withstand 
great power adverse interferences. In anticipation, the TAC called for cooperation within the 
region on the basis of independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national 
identity of all nations; the right to self-determination; and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of one another. In fact, the TAC has raised the proposal of ZOPFAN Declaration to 
the level of a treaty in which all signatories are entitled to comply under international law.  
Later, the TAC became the principles for establishing a code of international conduct 
on the South China Sea for confidence-building, security cooperation and pacific dispute 
settlements at the ASEAN Regional Forum inaugural meeting in July 1994. This included the 
establishment of a High Council consisting a ministerial level representative from each of the 
High Contracting Parties. The Code of Conduct on the South China Sea will be further 
elaborated in another session of this paper. It is important to note that up until now, the TAC 
remains as the only regional diplomatic tool in providing guidelines and procedures for 
pacific dispute settlement.  
China acceded to the TAC at the 9th ASEAN Summit in October 2003 and it is the 
first non-Southeast Asian country to undertake the TAC. China accession to TAC has 
enhanced the mutual trust in the Sino-ASEAN relationship and consolidated the foundation 
of the Sino-ASEAN strategic partnership for peace and prosperity. The significance of China 
joining TAC is that China has agreed to adopt upon non-military ways to handle disputes 
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with ASEAN states as a credit to the role of dialogue and consultation process of the ASEAN 
Way.  
Besides China, the US has also acceded the TAC in 2009, as a result of the US 
attitudes shift towards Southeast Asia under the Obama’s administration. Alongside with the 
US accession to TAC, a series of activities took place in the same period of time, such as 
Hilary Clinton’s visit to Indonesia and the kick-off of the ASEAN-US Summit. US actions in 
2009 had much symbolic value in reassuring ASEAN members its commitment to the region 
and also, to signal to China that US intended to play a leading role in the region.  
When China first acceded to the TAC, it can be considered as ASEAN’s success to 
engage China and that ASEAN and China’s security interests can be accommodated. Yet, for 
some reason, ASEAN continued to be aware of China’s aggressive military expansion and 
felt the needs to seek an external power to balance or hedge against China. In ASEAN’s 
perspective, US presence in the region can balance against a rising China in conflicts or 
disputes. However, this has posed a threat to China since the enlargement of the ASEAN-US 
relationship reflects a rebalancing strategy towards the strengthened China-ASEAN ties, 
which may in turn, stretch the China-ASEAN ties apart. 
 
7.3.3 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) (1995) 
While ASEAN’s attitude towards external power changes, it started to tilt their policy 
direction towards engagement rather than exclusion.23 Apart from the TAC, ASEAN has 
attempted to build a security framework including great powers outside the region, after the 
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Cambodia Conflict in 1978, when there is a genuine need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in Southeast Asia. The Treaty called for the "Prohibition of the use, storage, passage, or 
testing of nuclear weapons and their components within the Zone."24 
The initiative to develop the SEANWFZ was rooted in the ZOPFAN Declaration in 
1971 but was ill defined until 1995. The obscure areas in the Treaty included the area to be 
covered, the problems of verification and compliance, the kind of nuclear activities to be 
prohibited and more.25 Finally concluded on 15 December 1995 and been effective since 28 
March 1997, the SEANWFZ was signed by 10 ASEAN member states. One of the major 
objectives of the Treaty is to provide a Protocol for the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), 
as recognized in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to access 
SEANWFZ. The five NWS met with officials from ASEAN to discuss the signing of the 
Treaty 6 years after the Treaty was concluded.  
China supports the Treaty and expressed its interest to ratify the protocol, while the 
other four NWS cited geographical space as a major stumbling block. Former Chinese 
Foreign Minister had expressed in a statement to the NPT Review and Extension Conference 
in 1995 that “China supports the efforts of relevant countries and regions to establish nuclear-
weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction through voluntary 
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consultations.”26 China also emphasized its adherence to peaceful intentions in the 2010 
Defense White Paper with reference to the treaty of NWFZs.27 Nonetheless, the objective to 
include the five NWS in the Treaty failed in the end. China was supposed to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding on the SEANWFZ Treaty on 8 July 2010. However, the 
other four NWS remained reserved about the protocol. The protocol stipulates that NWS 
must abide to articles of the Treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
States parties. ASEAN then decided to postpone all NWS ratifications. Two days after, 
ASEAN announced that the five NWS were all not ready to sign the Treaty, referring to the 
same issue of concern. Since then, the discussion of the SEANWFZ Treaty has cooled down 
and ASEAN’s attention has shift to the negotiation of the territory dispute between ASEAN 
states and China over the South China Sea.  
 
7.3.4 Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity (2003) 
The Joint Declaration was signed by the Heads of State/Government of the ASEAN 
members and the People's Republic of China at the same time when China acceded to the 
TAC on 7 October 2003. The objective of putting forward the establishment of a strategic 
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partnership is to foster mutually beneficial cooperation between China and ASEAN and 
contribute to regional long-term development and peace.28  
There are five major areas of cooperation, namely politics, economics, social, security, 
and regional and international affairs. Under the political-security cooperation aspect, there 
were frequent contacts and interactions between ASEAN and Chinese leaders, ministers, 
senior officials and military personnel. In order to continue to deepen the ASEAN-China 
Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, and to support the establishment of the 
ASEAN Community in 2015, the two parties outlined more details on the partnership in the 
2011-2015 five-year action plan to pursue joint actions in defence cooperation. The TAC, 
SEANWFZ and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea were 
brought up again as the central and fundamental measures under the ASEAN framework to 
engage China in security matters.  
The strategic partnership formed is a remarkable milestone in the ASEAN-China 
relationship. Previously, ASEAN members’ normalisation of relationship with China was 
basically bilateral, such as Indonesia in 1990, followed by Singapore and Brunei. Now, it is 
moving towards a more multilateral direction. However, as discussed above, China has yet 
realized the SEANWFZ and the disputes in South China Sea are becoming more and more 
alarming, which hinder the defence cooperation between China and ASEAN member states.  
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7.4 China and ASEAN States Military Expenditure 
According to a recent study released by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
on defence spending by Southeast Asia countries, the region shows steady growth in military 
expenditure from 2010 to 2014, with the exception of Indonesia.29 During the Golden Decade 
(2003-2012) of the China-ASEAN relationship, the average increase in defence spending was 
132.0% (See Figure 1). Among all ASEAN countries, Vietnam showed the strongest growth 
by 229.2%, followed by Indonesia (264.0%), Cambodia (220.4%) and Thailand (190.3%) 
during the period, which were all above the average. In the past five years, the average 
increase in defence spending for ASEAN was 37.6%, and Vietnam was again showing the 
most robust increase by 59.1% (See Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1 – China and ASEAN Military Expenditure from 2003 to 2014 
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Figure 2– ASEAN States Military Expenditure from 2003 to 2014 
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The rise was most robust in less developed countries as these countries were trying to 
catch up with more developed countries in terms of military build-up. Meanwhile, Singapore 
has the largest military spending among all ASEAN states and accounted for over a quarter of 
ASEAN’s total defence spending in 2014 (See Figure 3). China, on the other hand, also had a 
double-digit increase in military spending over the Golden Decade. China and ASEAN’s 
military spending were close to each other up until 2005, when China surpassed ASEAN by 
more than three folds. After 2005, the gap between them has further widen, and by 2014, 
China’s military expenditure was about six times of that of ASEAN’s.  
 
Figure 3– Percentage of Military Expenditure within ASEAN in 2014 
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7.5 US Rebalance  
The United States has shifted a substantial part of its military capacities from Middle 
East to the Asia-Pacific and to restructure its regional security arrangements. The 
announcement was first made in late 2011, however, the details of the rebalance only become 
clearer since 2014. Despite the sequestration cut, President Obama is making the rebalance a 
priority. When President Obama addressed at the Australian Parliament, he insisted that the 
United States is a Pacific Power and the reductions in US defence spending will not come at 
the expense of Asia Pacific.30 In June 2013, Secretary of Defence Hagel echoed President 
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Obama’s adamant in his address at the IISS regional security conference in Singapore that the 
United States will continue to implement the rebalance, and prioritize its investment and 
activities in Asia-Pacific.31 He also called attention to US plans to host a meeting with the 
ASEAN defence ministers in Hawaii in 2014 and summarized the US commitment by saying, 
“our relationships with ASEAN nations are critical.”32 
By 2014, the US Air Force has already allocated 60 percent of its overseas-based 
forces to the Asia-Pacific region. The Philippines and the United States are discussing new 
military cooperation options, including the rotation of surveillance aircraft in the Philippines, 
rotating US troops more frequently into the country, and staging more frequent joint 
exercises.33 The US Department of Defense also reemphasized its efforts to improve their 
capabilities to defeat “Anti-Access/Area Denial” strategies, which are known to be the focus 
of China’s military.34 There is a new Air-Sea Battle (ASB) initiative in the rebalance that 
intends to increase the joint operation effectiveness of the US Navy and Air Force units. 
Development of the ASB was announced in President Obama’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31Zhou Fangyin, "Short-Term Success Won’t Prove Enough to Achieve Us Aims in Asia-
Pacific," Global Times, February 7 2013. 
32 Robert G Sutter, "The U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific," in The United States and Asia: 
Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First-Century Relations (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2015), 87. 
33 Mark E. Manyin et al., "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ 
toward Asia," (Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
34 ADM. Jonathan Greenert and GEN. Mark Welsh, "Breaking the Kill Chain," Foreign 
Policy, May 17 2013. 
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Review. Although the information about the ASB is very limited, the new initiative will focus 
on attacks that the adversary requires for an area-denial strategy35.  
If China continues or intensifies its assertive policies on maritime and territorial 
disputes, Southeast Asian countries are likely to favour closer ties with the United States. 
While the US is “hedging” against China’s growing military power, ASEAN members are 
“balancing” against China by aligning with non-threatening great power, in particular, while 
China’s assertiveness in territorial claims in the South China Sea continues to increase.36 
Among the 10 ASEAN countries, the Philippines and Singapore have officially supported 
greater US military presence in the region. This is not a coincidence with their territorial 
disputed embroiled with China. Compared with other countries, Singapore has put a lot of 
effort to forester closer strategic cooperation to stabilize the United States’ influence in the 
region. Meanwhile, Burma, India and Vietnam have also taken significant moves to enhance 
the relationships with the United States for strategic security reassurance while carefully 
maintaining their close economic ties with China.  
In China’s perspective, the United States’ security reassurance to Asia-Pacific is a 
containment strategy targeted at China. Any perceived aggressive intention from the US 
would provoke backlash in China. For example, China urged the US to “abandon [its] zero-
sum game” and scrap “the Cold War mentality”, arguing that the rebalance threatens regional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,"  (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2012). 
36 Thomas Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s 
Abrasive Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 54-57. 
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stability.37 China’s April 2013 Defense White Paper also stated that, “some country has 
strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, 
and frequently makes the situation there tenser.”38 China has not censured the United States’ 
increased attention to ASEAN. In fact, China has resisted the United States’ effort to promote 
regional integration and impose serious criticisms on the intention of the US. However, China 
becomes less wary only after the US shifted its focus on military to economic and diplomatic 
initiatives. China is becoming more positive towards their relationship as well as a US-China 
military engagement during the Obama administration.39 
 
7.6 An Arms Race or a Security Community? 
The definition of arms race denotes an underlying dynamic of competition among the 
actors. As Barry Buzan pointed out, “the term arms race suggests self-stimulating military 
rivalry between states, in which their efforts to defend themselves militarily cause them to 
enhance the threats they pose to each other.”40 The continued military build-up within 
ASEAN countries can be reflected by a senior Thai military official’s statement that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Xinhua, "China Urges Politicians to Discard Cold War Mentality," Chian Daily, September 
29 2011. 
38 "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces,"  (Beijing: Information Office of 
the State Council, 2013). 
39 Yao Yunzhu, "Boost for Sino-U.S. Military Ties," China Daily, June 17 2013. 
40 Amitav Acharya, "Preventive Diplomacy: Concept, Theory and Strategy," in The Next 
Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region ed. 
Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, 1999), 93-115. 
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Thailand’s naval forces ‘should be at least as well-equipped as those of other members of 
ASEAN in order to have bargaining power’.41 
To elaborate, neo-realist theory would explain the shortfall and the reasons for the 
failure of international cooperation, in terms of anarchy and self-interest driven state nature. 
In short, notable changes in the distribution of power may produce new security threats for 
states, stimulating external alliance, either by bandwagoning or balancing against the 
revisionist power.42 This may cause a spiral of military build-up and untangle cooperation 
that may have existed among them.  
ASEAN countries are being driven by both internal balancing and external balancing 
in face of a rising and increasingly assertive China. One of the major reasons behind the 
increased military spending in ASEAN countries is the withdrawal of the US military aid.43 
Since then, they are trying to mobilize their resources and acquire more arm forces 
acquisitions to enhance their military capacity to achieve internal balancing while forming 
military alliance with the US to balance against China. The perceptions of threat plays a vital 
role in ASEAN’s security community building programme. Common uncertainty within 
ASEAN states towards the changing regional balance of power is also critical for the 
foundation of their defence strategy, particularly the uncertain intension from a rising China 
and the sense of a “power vacuum” in the post-Cold war milieu. These have caused the 
ASEAN states to move towards a more self-reliance basis on military programmes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid. 
42 Deutsch, "Security Communities," 99. 
43 Amitav Acharya, "The ARF Could Well Unravel," in The Evolving Pacific Power 
Structure, ed. Derek Da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 63-69. 
69 
 
	  
Undoubtedly, China’s military power will continue to grow in the years ahead. This 
will continue to make the neighbouring countries feel insecure and gear up for military 
defence. It is also obvious that China is attempting to divide the institutions to address 
sovereignty disputes by its continuing preference to deal with this issue in a bilateral setting. 
By doing this, China is at a better advantage to exert its power and achieve its goals.  
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 8 Territorial Dispute Settlement: Declaration of Conduct in South China Sea 
8.1 Background 
The South China Sea Territorial Dispute is concerning the competing claims of South 
China Sea by different states as part of their Territorial Waters or Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). Five Asian states are involved in this Dispute, namely, Brunei, China, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Vietnam, and they have all publicly declared their claims over different part 
of the South China Sea. Certainly, there are many reasons why states are concerned or 
intrigued to claim sovereignty over the South China Sea. As most scholars have pointed out, 
resources and strategic considerations are the two major reasons behind.1  
In terms of the latter consideration, as argued by some scholars, South China Sea is 
the “centre of gravity moving from West to East – where the Indian Ocean maritime realm 
meets the Pacific Ocean maritime realm – connected by the Malacca Strait”.2 Given that most 
states in East Asia are export-led economies, whoever controls the South China Sea 
essentially controls the Strategic Line of Communications (SLOC) of most East Asian states, 
where they are both rich and influential in the international stage.  
Table 1 depicts the reliance of different East Asian economies on export, namely, 
China, Japan and Korea. In addition, the same situation also applied to other claimants in the 
disputes, and their reliance on export is greater than the three major East Asian economies.  
 
Table 1 - East Asian States' Export of Goods and Services (%GDP) 3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Leszek Buszynski, "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.–China Strategic 
Rivalry.," Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012): 139-56. 
2 Mohd Aminul Karim, "The South China Sea Disputes: Is High Politics Overtaking?," 
Pacific Focus 28, no. 1 (2013): 99-119. 
3 "Export of Goods and Services (% of GDP),"  (United Nations Statistics Division, 2015). 
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Due to this reliance on exports by its East Asian allies, the United States also 
considers the South China Sea as its vital national interest. Also, as Scott Snyder claimed, the 
South China Sea is “a transit point and operation area of US Navy and Air Force between 
military bases in Asia and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas”.4 In light of this, the US 
has been expressing its concerns over the deteriorating situation of the South China Sea 
Dispute since 2010. Therefore, from China’s perspective, effectively controlling the South 
China Sea does not only mean gaining leverage over Japan, Korea or even Taiwan, but also 
means shifting the strategic balance of East Asia from the US to China.  
Apart from its strategic significance, the South China Sea also possess a huge amount 
of economic resources, especially energy that alone can benefit the economy of any one of 
the claimants.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Scott Snyder, "The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy," (United 
States Institute of Peace, 1996). 
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It is crucial to note that all of the claimants are developing economies. Hence, gaining 
an upper hand over the South China Sea Dispute and at the end, obtaining the economic 
resources in South China Sea for their own economic development, would be the optimal 
outcome for all of them. Specifically speaking, from China’s perspective, the resources in the 
South China Sea are important for China’s energy security. For instance, based on the 
Chinese claim over South China Sea, which is essentially the whole of it, the oil reserve that 
China would gain will enable it to become the 6th largest oil reserve state in the world, 
surpassing Russia and some of the Gulf States. As the largest net oil importer, reducing its 
reliance on external energy supply is not only an economic issue for China, but also a 
strategic consideration, in which the Communist government can maintain its domestic 
legitimacy through sustaining a high and continuous economic growth.5 
Given the significance of the area, one could imagine that there would be a lot of 
conflicts in the area. However, except in 1988, when the Chinese Navy clashed with the 
Vietnamese Coast Guard, there was no serious conflict between claimants in the subsequent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The energy reserve figures in South China Sea are highly contested. In terms of crude oil, 
the figure ranges from 11 billion barrels to 100 billion barrels. In terms of natural gas, the 
figure ranges from 128 trillion cubic feet to 498 trillion cubic feet. Since the focus of this 
paper is on China, the above estimate that China would surpass Russia in terms of oil reserve 
is based upon on the figure from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 100 billion 
barrels. Leslie Hook, "Gas Finds Give Impetus to China Sea Claim," Financial Times  (2012); 
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2010," in U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2010-3015. (United States Geological Survey, 
2010); "Contested Areas of South China Sea Likely Have Few Conventional Oil and Gas 
Resources,"  (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). 
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two decades.6 In 2002, China and ASEAN States concluded the Declaration of Conduct in 
South China Sea (DoC) to “promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the 
South China Sea”.7  
There are ten articles in the DoC and they are mainly concerning the behaviour of the 
disputed parties to ensure the freedom of passage, to build trust through mutual actions, and 
to refrain from undertaking unilateral actions. Arguably, these doctrines are merely cheap 
talks. Indeed, the DoC does not pose any hard restrictions on claimants’ behaviours. However, 
scholars have argued that ASEAN has always been deploying a hedging strategy when they 
are interacting with China, given the asymmetric power balance between itself and China.8 A  
key reason why China would participate in the negotiation of the DoC is to prevent the 
possible involvement of the US on the Dispute.9 Therefore, even though ASEAN states are 
well aware that the DoC is non-binding, it can still serve as a deterrence to China, such that if 
China does not respect the DoC, ASEAN states may involve the US into the game, a scenario 
that China would definitely want to prevent.  
Among all the areas covered by the DoC, the most significant part is Article 4, in 
which China and ASEAN states agree that the Dispute should be settled “in accordance with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct and the South China Sea," 
Contemporary Southeash Asia 25, no. 3 (2003): 343-62. 
7 "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,"  (The Governments of the 
Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China, 2002).  
8 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "ASEAN and Evolving Power Relations in East Asia: Strategies and 
Constraints," Contemporary Politics 18, no. 4 (2012): 400-15. 
9 David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and 
the Evolving East Asian Regional Order " International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 148-84. 
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universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea”.10 This was the first time that China has explicitly agreed to settle its 
territorial dispute through multilateral mechanism. Some scholars have even argued that the 
DoC is “a change in China’s approach towards the Dispute” and it is “a vindication of 
ASEAN’s efforts to engage China in dialogue over the issue”.11  
What happened in the past years was certainly a positive sign in which the South 
China Sea Dispute could be settled peacefully, especially when China was willing to commit 
self-constrains on its own behaviour through the DoC under the asymmetrical power balance 
between itself and ASEAN as a whole. However, incidents occurred since 2010 have 
undermined this optimism. Nevertheless, it certainly does not mean that China has not been 
benefiting from its policies on the Dispute. The following section of the paper will examine 
whether China has gain significant influence over ASEAN with the conclusion of the DoC. 
 
8.2 Which Lens is More Likely? 
It is necessary to understand the motivation of China to conclude the DoC before 
analysing whether China has gained benefits from concluding the DoC with ASEAN. 
However, such information cannot be obtained through official channels. Therefore, China’s 
motivations will be reviewed by using three main streams of IR paradigms: Realism, 
Liberalism and Constructivism, to assess which paradigm can best explain China’s cause of 
action on the Dispute.  
From a Realist perspective, China concluded the DoC with ASEAN to buy time to 
consolidate its own power against the ASEAN states and possibly, the US as well. Given that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea." 
11 Buszynski, "ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct and the South China Sea," 343-62. 
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China is on the trajectory to gain huge economic might over ASEAN states in 2002, and 
especially when China was pushing forward the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), what China needed in 2002 was to avoid direct conflict with ASEAN states, and 
the DoC served exactly for that purpose.12 As argued by Realist scholars, with the DoC, 
“China avoided any commitment to a legally binding code, and did not relinquish its 
historical claim to its lost territory or its preference to resolve the Dispute bilaterally”.13 
From a Liberalist perspective, leveraging international institutions can be an 
acceptable mean for China in managing the South China Sea Dispute.14 This is a plausible 
intention for China, since after the end of Cold War, China has been actively participating in 
different international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization in 2001. The 
increasing economic interdependence between China and the rest of world will also force 
China to engage in such an established mechanism rather than allowing China to strong arm 
its counterpart at will under a bilateral setting.  
Finally, from a Constructivist perspective, it has been argued that throughout the 
interactions between China and ASEAN, China has changed its scepticism over 
multilateralism since 1994, when it was invited to engage in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF). China’s willingness to conclude the DoC with ASEAN is the manifestation that China 
realizes the value of multilateralism, as a result of the continuous socialization by ASEAN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Nicholas Khoo, Michael L. R. Smith, and David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia? 
Caveat Lector," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 196-211. 
13 Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian 
Regional Order " 148-84. 
14 Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?," International Security 28, no. 3 (2003): 
149-64. 
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states with China to accept the ASEAN way to resolving states’ differences. Furthermore, 
China did not only conclude this non-binding DoC with ASEAN states, but also started to 
engage ASEAN to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct (CoC), which again proved that the 
conclusion of the DoC is not a single and exclusive event.15 
 
8.3 Which Lens is More Likely? 
The Realist lens is found to best explain the cause of action for China to conclude the 
DoC with ASEAN states in 2002. This conclusion is based on a few incidents subsequent to 
the conclusion of the DoC.  
First, there are numerous articles in the DoC referring to the UNCLOS, including 
Article 4, which is considered to be one of the most significant Article in the document:  
 
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional 
disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through 
friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in 
accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.16  
 
From the drafting of the Article, it is evident that the idea to settle the South China 
Sea Dispute with reference to internationally recognized principles or mechanisms was 
brought up and accepted by all parties, including China. However, China chose to opt out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Hiro Katsumata, David Martin Jones, and Michael L. R. Smith, "ASEAN, Regional 
Integration, and State Sovereignty," International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 182-88. 
16 "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea." 
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from the dispute settlement mechanism of the UNCLOS in 2006 has effectively undermined 
the DoC. When Philippines submitted its request for arbitration by the United Nations over 
the claim of China on the whole of South China Sea in 2014, China’s action has further 
reinforced the perception that China has no intention to resolve the Dispute through non-
bilateral mechanism. In China’s position paper published in December 2014, which is 
arguably a “response” to The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, China explicitly 
stated that “it will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration thus initiated by the 
Philippines” and that “the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction over the present 
arbitration”.17  
The perception of Southeast Asian states on China’s withdrawal is unimportant but 
the fact that China has taken an active stand against the multilateral mechanism or 
international arbitration in resolving territorial disputes has profound implications. In fact, 
China has never lost any territories except in one occasion when China voluntarily transfers 
the sovereignty of the White Dragon Tail Island in the Tonkin Gulf to North Vietnam in 
1957.18 These historical events have reinforced the Realists’ claims that China will never 
settle its territorial dispute with Southeast Asian states through its own concessions/loses but 
it is possible in the case of a multilateral or international arbitration. As ASEAN states are 
unlikely to challenge China with their economic or military might, there is little motivation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 "Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of 
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines," 
news release, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml. 
18 M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation," International 
Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 46-83. 
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for China to conceive on this sensitive issue, both internationally and more importantly, 
domestically.  
Finally, as argued by scholars, domestic political interest rather than national power 
will enable state to gain more in a multilateral negotiation.19 As such, China and in fact all the 
concerned states, are all in a very good position to negotiate for their own benefits in any 
multilateral settings for the Dispute, given that most of their citizens are concerned with the 
South China Sea Dispute. (See Table 2) 
 
Table 2 - Popular Concern on Territorial Disputes with China20 
 
 
In fact, the DoC concluded in 2002 was never meant to be the end goal of ASEAN, at 
least in mitigating the tension in South China Sea. As depicted in Article 10 of the DoC, it 
has been explicitly mentioned that the Parties concerned will work towards the goal of 
concluding the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, which would be a set of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Gerald Schneider, "Capacity and Concessions: Bargaining Power in Multilateral 
Negotiations," Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 665-89. 
20 "Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s 
Image,"  (Pew Research Center, 2014). 
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concrete rules agreed upon by all parties to undertake in relations to the issue of South China 
Sea, unlike the DoC, which is merely wishes by all parties that states should behave in a 
certain manner:  
 
10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South 
China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, 
on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective. 
 
After the DoC has been concluded, ASEAN states and China did engage in regular 
talks to discuss on the implementation of the DoC and it has took them 9 years to conclude 
the guidelines for the implementation of the DoC.21 It is not until 2013, in the 9th Joint 
Working Group Meeting, that the consultations on the CoC was brought up officially for the 
first time.22 So, one would conclude that it has never been the intention of China to work 
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Post, July 21 2011. 
22 "The Sixth Senior Officials Meeting and the Ninth Joint Working Group Meeting on the 
Implementation of the "Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" Are Held 
in Suzhou," news release, September 15, 2013, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1079289.shtml. "ASEAN and China 
Launch Official Consultations on Code of Conduct in South China Sea; Phl Calls for 
Deliberate and Rules-Based Process in Moving Forward," news release, September 16, 2013, 
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towards the goal set out in Article 10 of the DoC, while ASEAN has been urging China to 
conclude the CoC with them in every Joint Communiqués of the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meetings since 2006. The reason why China would be willing to re-engage in talks on the 
CoC was probably due to the active engagement of US by ASEAN on the issue since 2010 in 
which it has always tried to avoid.  
On a separate note, China has deviated from the principles of the “ASEAN way” 
while engaging the ASEAN states on the Dispute. Ever since 2009, the confrontations 
between China and various claimants in the South China Sea have been escalating, incidents 
such as expelling fishing boats, monitoring/harassing marine survey vessels have occurred 
repeatedly.23 In one occasion, the target of the Chinese Coast Guard Operation is the USNS 
Impeccable, instead of civilian vessels from the claimant of the South China Sea in the 
previous incidents.24 Scholars have claimed that through these actions, China is showing to 
the world that it has active control over the whole of South China Sea, which aligns with the 
general strategy to hold on to disputed territories. Finally, China has been reclaiming lands in 
the South China Sea area. A widely reported figure is that China has reclaimed 2,000 acres of 
artificial lands in the Spratlys since 2013.25  
All in all, the Realist lens on China’s cause of action to conclude the DoC with 
ASEAN states is the most appropriate analytical paradigm. As depicted by Realist, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Carlyle A. Thayer, "China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China 
Sea," International Journal of China Studies 2, no. 3 (2011): 555-83. 
24 Sam Bateman, "Solving the "Wicked Problems" of Maritime Security: Are Regional 
Forums up to the Task?," Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 1 (2011): 1-28. 
25 Gordon Lybold and Adam Entous, "U.S. Says Beijing Is Building up South China Sea 
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international institution is merely a reflection of the distribution of power in the international 
system, as the most powerful states can create and shape institutions to maintain their share of 
world power.26  
 
8.4 Did China Gain from the DoC? 
Therefore, based on the above analysis, if China’s intention to conclude the DoC with 
ASEAN states can be explained in a Realist perspective, did China really gain significantly 
from this action?  
Before answering this question, two main concepts need to be defined. First, what is 
meant by “gain” in terms of Realism and second, what it meant by “significant”. In terms of 
the first question, it is essentially a recap of the Realist explanation on states’ behaviour in the 
anarchic international system, that states concern about relative distribution of power and 
they would seek to maximize their power so that they can improve their relative position over 
the other states just to ensure their survival.27 In terms of the second question, that it has 
enabled China to conduct its affairs it could not have done before.  
Based upon ASEAN’s reception to China on the matter of South China Sea issue, two 
periods of time after the conclusion of the DoC in 2002 shall be divided at 2010.  
In the first period, from 2002 to 2010, China has gained from the conclusion of DoC 
due to the following reasons. First, the fact that ASEAN states did not make a flux about the 
South China Sea issue is already beneficial to China. This can be viewed from the various 
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Joint Communiqués of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (AMM) since 2002 till 2010, 
all Communiqués more or less contain the same message as follows: 28  
 
21. We reaffirmed the continuing importance of the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea of 2002 (DOC) as a milestone document between 
ASEAN and China, embodying our collective commitment to ensure the peaceful 
resolution of disputes in the area. We believe that the Declaration has been effective 
in building mutual trust and confidence among the claimants in the area and in 
maintaining peace and stability in the region. We underscored the need to intensify 
efforts to move forward the implementation of the Declaration, including the early 
finalisation of the Guidelines on the Implementation of the DOC. We looked forward 
to the eventual conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 
 
This shows that ASEAN states are comfortable or at least contained with the status 
quo back then, especially with the phrase, “We believe that the Declaration has been 
effective…” 
A caveat here is the ability for China to affect the collective action of ASEAN, as 
argued by some scholars, which relates back to the consensus based decision-making process 
of the organization, the ASEAN way. It has been argued that China has been successful in 
playing its divide and rule card and by relying on ASEAN states that are close to itself, such 
as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, to prevent ASEAN from undertaking collective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 "ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)," ASEAN, 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/category/asean-
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confrontational position against itself.29 Although this may very well be true, it certainly does 
not mean that China could have affected ASEAN states to take a friendlier position towards 
itself, since an outsider veto, by definition can only help prevent things from happening.  
Furthermore, the fact that the matter is contained between China and ASEAN can also 
be seen as an achievement with the position that China and ASEAN have been taking 
together, which is to not involve non-Asian states from involving, specifically, the United 
States. In fact, in the first ASEAN – US Leaders Meeting’s Communiqué in 2009/2010, there 
was no mention of the South China Sea Dispute, which contradicts with the position that US 
has been taking at the same time of the year.  
Finally, even ASEAN states would agree that during this period of time, the 
relationship between ASEAN and China had improved significantly, such as economic 
interaction, as evident from the negotiation of CAFTA. To put it differently, the leverage that 
China has gained over ASEAN states on the issue has definitely been increased, while the 
perception of a China’s threat has diminished during the same period of time.  
 After 2010, things have changed because of the more assertive position taken by 
China. The wording in the AMM Joint Communiqués on South China Sea become much 
stronger and in 2012, the internal division of ASEAN has prevented the AMM from issuing a 
Joint Communiqués, which is the first time in ASEAN’s 47 years history,30 It is said that this 
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30 Yoshimatsu, "ASEAN and Evolving Power Relations in East Asia: Strategies and 
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incident is due to the wordings of the joint communiqués on the South China Sea issue in 
which Cambodia is not comfortable with and refuse to endorse.31  
As mentioned previously, the phrase, “We believe that the Declaration has been 
effective… “, has been repeating itself in almost every AMM Joint Communiqués since 2003. 
However, after 2010, this phrase no longer appears and instead, the phrase “…reaffirmed the 
importance of maintaining peace, stability, maritime security as well as freedom of 
navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea…” or alike32 has been appearing in 
every Joint Communiqués since 2010. This is obviously a shift in attitude for all ASEAN 
members towards China’s action in South China Sea since 2010 and why 2010 should be 
seen as a turning point when China gains from its strategy and policy on South China Sea 
diminished.   
Furthermore, the Joint Statement of the 2011 ASEAN-US Summit also had explicit 
wording that South China Sea issue is an issue that concern both ASEAN and the US. This is 
a sharp difference from the 2010 ASEAN-US Summit Joint Statement and it is a strong 
evidence that US has been re-engaged to balance China by ASEAN. Subsequently, the then 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, also issued another statement, explicitly stating that the 
United States “as a Pacific nation and resident power… have a national interest in freedom of 
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navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, 
and respect for international law in the South China Sea”.33 
A caveat here is that, how would the “China’s ally” in ASEAN, namely Cambodia, 
Laos and Myanmar allow ASEAN to re-engage the United States and as well as to issue some 
more confrontational Joint communiqués? This can be accounted for from various angles. 
First, ASEAN may have successfully socialized the “China’s ally”, which is the main 
objective for ASEAN to include them into ASEAN in the first place or it may also be due to 
the strength of the United States, in which it can act as a hegemon to force ASEAN states 
undertaking a stronger position against China. Of course, one can never fully comprehend the 
intention of individual states while they are undertaking certain actions.  
A more substantial argument is the fact that China’s rival in the region has increased 
their support to “China’s ally” in ASEAN. For example, Japan has been increasing its aid to 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar since 2009. In the Fourth Mekong-Japan Summit in 2012, 
Japan has formulated the Tokyo Strategy 2012 with 5 Mekong states, namely, Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam to develop the Mekong River Delta in which Japan 
committed to inject 600 Billion Japanese Yen of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 
3 years’ time for the purpose.34 In the seventh Mekong-Japan Summit in 2015, with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 "Clinton Statement on South China Sea," news release, 23rd July, 2011, 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/07/20110723125330su0.9067433.ht
ml?distid=ucs#axzz3YxXDkFuV. 
34 "Tokyo Strategy 2012 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation," news release, April 21, 2012, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/mekong/summit04/joint_statement_en.html. 
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formulation of the New Tokyo Strategy 2015, Japan has committed another 750 Billion 
Japanese Yen of ODA in another 3 years’ time for the same purpose.35  
Without going into details of how much these ODA are allocated to the three “China’s 
ally” in ASEAN (See Table 3), even if the ODA are only distributed among the 5 Mekong 
states evenly, 2.2 Billion US Dollars each, Japan is already providing aid comparable to 
China for Cambodia in the past 20 years.36 Apart from ODA, Asian Development Bank, an 
international organization closely related to the Japanese government has also been financing 
projects in those three states with a drastic increase in scale starting from 2012. (See Table 4) 
 
Table 3 - Japan's ODA for Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from 2009 to 2013 (in ¥100 
Million)37 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 "New Tokyo Strategy 2015 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation," news release, July 4, 2015, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/page1e_000044.html. 
36 It is reported that China has provided U.S. 2.85 Billion to Cambodia from 1992-2014, 
mostly in the form of concessional loan. Vann Vichar, "China Pledges Multimillion-Dollar 
Development Aid to Cambodia," Radio Free Asia, November 10 2014. 
37 "Japan's ODA Data by Country,"  (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015). 
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Table 4 –ADB Financing to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from 2009 to 2014 (in Billion US) 
38 
 
 
What this entails is an obvious change in attitude by the three “China’s ally” on the 
South China Sea Dispute, and this attitude was expressed in the Joint Communiqués of the 
Seventh Mekong-Japan Summit, especially after the widely reported China’s land 
reclamations and military activities in South China Sea, which is essentially an unrelated 
issue from the Mekong Rive development.39 It is still too early to say whether the three 
“China’s ally” have defected from their alignment with China, but this certainly created more 
complication for China’s future manoeuvre over ASEAN on the South China Sea issue.  
 
8.5 What did China Gain and Lose? 
 As mentioned, a key reason why China concluded the DoC with ASEAN states in 
2002 was to focus its own diplomatic effort on another more important issue, the negotiation 
of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), in which the proceeding of the 
negotiation was relatively smooth as compared with the negotiation of the CoC. This is 
considered as a triumph for China, as it has effectively increased the interdependency of the 
ASEAN and China economy and in the long run, as depicted in the Sino-ASEAN Economic 
Relations section of this paper, increases its political leverage over the ASEAN states.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 "ADB Project Data,"  (Asian Development Bank, 2015). 
39 "New Tokyo Strategy 2015 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation." 
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For China, a more concrete gain from the conclusion of CoC and the eight years of 
relatively stable time in the region provides an opportunity to improve its Sea Power. In a 
broad sense, Sea Power can either describes the military or civilian use of the ocean to 
improve the overall power of states or the capacity of states to influence the behaviours of 
other actors in the ocean.40 This paper will focus on the latter definition because since 2002, 
China’s capacity to influence the behaviours of other actors has improved, as evident from 
the improvement of Chinese naval capabilities.  
According to the US Congressional Report on Chinese Naval Expansion, the 
cumulative size of the Chinese Navy has expanded dramatically since 2003, with every 
aspect of its naval capability either doubled or tripled, and the situation is especially pertinent 
in China’s near shore combat capability.41 This has enabled the Chinese Navy to impose 
effective control over its claim of the South China Sea, given that other claimants have a 
relatively weak navy. This trend also aligns with the overall increase of Chinese defence 
expenditure from 2003 to 2010.42  
Due to the lack of transparency on China’s defence expenditure, not much 
information can be obtained from the Chinese Government. In the various Defense White 
Papers that the Chinese Government published, the section related Chinese Arm Forces 
strength, such as deployment or weapon procurement, remains extremely vague. Also, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Geoffrey Till, "Chapter One: The Sea and Seapower," in Seapower: A Guide for the 
Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1-26. 
41 Ronald O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress," (Congressional Research Service, 2014), 5-37. 
42 "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2015,"  (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2015). 
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should be noted that in all these Defense White Papers published since 2003, the Chinese 
government has never mentioned the DoC but on the contrary, it included other security 
agreements China concluded with other ASEAN States, such as the Sino-Vietnamese Joint 
Patrol Agreement in Beibu Gulf, in which the Chinese government has recorded its 
implementation progress in details. In the 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper, it was the first 
time that there was a dedicated section discussing the role of the Chinese Defence Force in 
the “Protection of Chinese Maritime Right”.43 In the 2015 Chinese Defense White Paper, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 ""《2004 Nian Zhong Guo De Guo Fang》 Bai Pi Shu"《2004年中国的国防》白皮书 
["Chinese Defense in 2004" White Paper]," news release, December, 2004, 
http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249947.htm; ""《2006 Nian Zhong Guo 
De Guo Fang》 Bai Pi Shu"《2006年中国的国防》白皮书 ["Chinese Defense in 2006" 
White Paper]," news release, December, 2006, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-
01/06/content_4249948.htm; ""Guo Wu Yuan Zin Wen Ban Fab U 《2008 Nian Zhong Guo 
De Guo Fang》" 国务院新闻办发布《2008年中国的国防》（全文）[State Council 
Information Office Issued "Chinese Defense in 2008"]," news release, January, 2009, 
http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249949.htm; ""Zhong Guo Zheng Fu Fa 
Biao 《2010 Nian Zhong Guo De Guo Fang》 Bai Pi Shu (Quan Wen)" 中国政府发表
《2010年中国的国防》白皮书（全文）[Chinese Government Issued "Chinese Defense in 
2010" White Paper]," news release, March, 2011, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-
03/31/content_4249942.htm; ""Guo Fang Bai Pi Shu: Zhong Guo Wu Zhuang Li Liang De 
Duo Yang Hya Yun Gong (Quan Wen)" 国防白皮书:中国武装力量的多样化运用（全文）
[Chinese Defense White Paper: The Diversity Use of Chinese Arm Forces] " news release, 
March, 2013, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2013-04/16/content_4442839.htm. 
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has explicitly mentioned that “… some of its offshore neighbours take provocative actions 
and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally 
occupied… It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and 
interests”.44 The explicitness of China’s view on the other claimants’ actions in the South 
China Sea was unprecedented, and the fact that this was mentioned in the Chinese Defense 
White Paper also signified China’s willingness to resolve the Dispute through force.  
Comparatively speaking, all the other claimants of the South China Sea do not share 
the same growth rate in Military Expenditure with China and among them, the most 
significant one will be Vietnam, when for instance, it has doubled their military expenditure 
from 2003 to 2010. However, in terms of absolute amount, China military expenditure 
remains 50 times larger than Vietnam.45 All in all, an obvious gain for China after concluding 
the DoC from the 2002 to 2010 period is certainly the time and space for China to improve its 
Sea Power and to take up a more assertive stand on the issue.  
As mentioned, starting from 2010, China has been losing on the issue of the South 
China Sea, mainly due to the actions that it has undertaken, for example, the vigorous 
patrolling by Chinese Navy/Coast Guard, land reclamation in the Spratlys, etc. This has 
induced situations that China would wish to prevent in the first place, when it is concluding 
the DoC with ASEAN states, such as the re-engagement of the US by ASEAN states, the 
internationalization of the Dispute, and the reduction of mutual trust between China and 
ASEAN states. Specifically, Philippine has transformed its defence strategy from internal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 ""Zhong Guo De Jun Shi Zhan Lue (Quan Wen)" 中国的军事战略（全文）[Chinese 
Military Strategy (in Full)"," news release, May 2015, 
http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2015-05/26/content_4586684.htm. 
45 "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2015." 
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security to national defence, and has established a balancing tactics with US support which 
aligns with the general ASEAN strategy.46  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
In general, the position that China is taking in the South China Sea Dispute aligns 
with the grand strategy of China, in which it would 1) reward other states when their 
preferences converge, 2) persuade other states when their preferences are debated and 3) 
prevail other states in case their preferences diverge.47 However, due to insufficient Chinese 
power against the US, once China attempted to take up a more assertive position, i.e. to 
leverage the 3rd strategy, ASEAN states will seek more support from the United States to 
rebalance China, as evident in the case of the South China Sea Dispute.  
This section of the paper outlined the specific impact of China’s actions in dealing 
with the South China Sea Dispute. China has gained through the conclusion of the 
Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea in 2002 with time and space to improve its 
strategic position vis-to-vis the ASEAN state both economically and militarily. However, it is 
also obvious that it alone did not help China to resolve its conflict with ASEAN states, as the 
Dispute should never be considered as a bilateral issue, but rather a trilateral issue that would 
always involve the US. The fact that ASEAN states have re-engaged the US after China took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an 
Emergent China: Its Domestic and External Dimensions," Pacific Affairs 87, no. 1 (2014): 5-
27. 
47 David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 8-36. Evelyn Goh, "The Modes of China’s 
Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia," Asian Survey 54, no. 5 (2014): 825-48. 
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up a stronger and more assertive position on the issue starting from 2009/2010 is a case in 
point. As different scholars have argued, under the strategic rivalry between China and the 
US, the South China Sea Dispute will remain to be an enduring rivalry.48 Some scholars have 
even argued that because the US is involved, China could not have settled the Dispute too 
easily with ASEAN states, in fear that it will undermine the wider strategic rivalry between 
China and the US.49  
The consequences of China’s action to conclude the DoC with ASEAN states 
certainly have posed a very interesting theoretical question on China’s cognitive feedback 
mechanism to continue its diplomatic interactions with ASEAN states. In particular, how will 
China assess its current policy on South China Sea Dispute and to reshape its future policy? 
At this point in time, China is not in any way retreating from its current policy on South 
China Sea, even though the various issues or scenarios that China wished to prevent in 2002 
have emerged already. 
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 9 Concluding Remark 
Based on the above analysis from the political, economic and security perspectives, 
the Sino-ASEAN relations during the period between 2003 and 2012 is considered as the 
“Golden Decade”. Despite the South China Sea issue, the imbalance of trade (between 
particular countries) and the interference of external forces (mainly from Japan) during the 
“Golden Decade”, the Sino-ASEAN relations witnessed remarkable achievements, in 
particular, the gain from trade through the implementation of CAFTA. In general, the 
intertwined interests in economic development overcame the downside factors during the 
“Golden Decade”. Whether the Sino-ASEAN relations will enter into a “Diamond Decade”, 
the research points to a divergent outcome. 
In relation to the economic arena, the economic cooperation between China and 
ASEAN has improved dramatically over the past decade since the signing of the CAFTA in 
2002. China has become the largest trading partner of ASEAN, while ASEAN is the third 
largest trading partner of China. It is understood that China’s open push for the formation of 
the CAFTA is rather politically oriented. From a Constructivist point of view, China’s 
decision to offer the CAFTA should be read holistically, in the context of the Sino-ASEAN 
relations development as well as China’s interest and image building in Asia Pacific from the 
late 1990s till the early 2000s. Since then, China has gradually recognized the value of being 
a strategic partner of common interest with ASEAN. This has caused China to make some 
compromises while interacting with ASEAN, for example, offering the EHP in exchange to 
accelerate the conclusion and implementation of CAFTA. It was identified that China has 
successfully achieved its political agenda, transforming the perception of “China Threat” into 
“China Opportunity”, which enabled China to enjoy a constructive relation with ASEAN 
from 2003 till 2012.  
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At macro-economic level, China has gained strong economic influence over ASEAN 
as a result of the CAFTA. ASEAN states have been increasingly reliant on China in trade. 
The share of ASEAN’s exports to China increased from 4.8% in 2002 to 11.5% in 2011. This 
demonstrates and suggests that China’s market has become the major growth engine for 
ASEAN’s economy, and it will remain so in the near future. The competition between China 
and Japan in search of economic influence in the region is inevitable. Japan remains 
prominent as the second largest foreign investor in ASEAN, while China remains as the fifth 
place. However, given China’s recent economic diplomacy, such as its advocacy of the 
Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which aim to invest in 
connecting infrastructure projects to facilitate trades, will potentially lead to an explosive 
growth of China’s outbound FDI to ASEAN states. In contrast, there are limited economic 
policy options for Japan to response to China’s growing economic influence in the region. 
Perhaps, the most efficient way is to remind ASEAN states the security concern over China’s 
policy on the South China Sea Dispute. In exchange, Chinese officials have repeatedly 
emphasized that these should not overshadow the huge common economic interests. In this 
economic game, it is obvious that China is able to take initiative while Japan can only act 
rather passively to defend. 
In defence and security, achievements during the “Golden Decade” included China’s 
formal accession to TAC, the conclusion of the DoC, the participation in established annual 
defence and security consultation mechanisms with most ASEAN countries and joint 
trainings with Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia arm forces. Meanwhile, China and 
ASEAN cooperation in areas such as maritime security, science and technology, 
environmental protection, education, health, and culture are also making progress. However, 
as Realism remains as the most prevailing argument in international security, states’ concern 
on their own survival continues to undermine the positivism that China and ASEAN has 
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gained in the economic arena. The increasing military spending among China and ASEAN 
states supports the core assumption of defensive realism. While China’s military power will 
continue to grow in the years ahead, this will continue to make its neighbouring countries 
unsecure and gear up for military defence and seek greater support from United States to 
rebalance China. 
The South China Sea Dispute remains the key challenge for the overall Sino-ASEAN 
relations. The conclusion of the DoC may have once provided optimism to the improving 
relations between China and ASEAN in the first place, however, from the development 
during and after the Golden Decade, it is obvious the DoC has not been effective in managing 
the South China Sea Dispute. The most recent development of the South China Sea Dispute 
proves this, when China continues to undertake unilateral action such as land reclamation. 
Although there are talks that China would stop its land reclamation once the existing 
construction in the Spartlys is completed, the increasing intensity of the US military presence 
in the area shows that China’s regional rival is taking lightly of China’s commitment to 
manage and deescalate the tension in South China Sea. All in all, in the security arena, China 
has been perceived to continue its “talk and take” strategy, which has been damaging the 
Sino-ASEAN relations even in the light of increased bilateral economic tied.  
No matter how “bilateral” the term “Sino-ASEAN relations” may have sound, the fact 
that it involves twelve states, i.e. China, the ten ASEAN states and the US, has introduced 
much complexity for all the concerned states to manage this relationship. It is, therefore, 
imprudent to judge whether economic interest would one-day triumph security concern, or 
vice versa, in the Sino-ASEAN relations. Rather, managing such a complex relationship 
always requires a comprehensive strategy in both the economic arena and security arena. The 
fact that China has focused in economic growth but not security arrangement in the Golden 
Decade has been proved to be problematic. 
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An economic prosperity offered by China along with increasing imbalance of 
economic benefits as well as the growing assertiveness in the South China Sea may invite 
stronger rebalance from the US and Japan in the region. All these factors are pointing to 
challenge the fundamental principal of the “ASEAN Way” of consensus building and group 
decision-making. The ten ASEAN states may be divided and under pressure to take sides 
whether to grow with China or not. Under these conditions, a “Diamond Decade” is unlikely 
to come, unless China adopts new thinking to cope with these challenges. Of particular 
importance is for China to update Deng Xiaoping’s “hiding one’s capability and biding one’s 
time” strategy. China must understand that the reassurance policy of being cautious and 
undertaking no leadership it crafted during US absence in the region will no longer work at 
the time of US return. China’s silence on its ambitions about non-economic issues in the 
region will deepen ASEAN’s concerns about China using a “talk and take” strategy to 
eventually dominate the region. ASEAN countries may therefore welcome the US return to 
balance and check China.  
Chinese government under Xi Jinping would have to work on how to consolidate the 
political and strategic mutual trusts with ASEAN, instead of purely focusing on economic 
profits. Xi Jinping’s proposal for building a community of common destiny with ASEAN 
countries seems to be a constructive response. Economically, it calls for an upgrade of 
CAFTA to the ASEAN-led RCEP, as well as the development of an Asia-Pacific free trade 
area. In the security arena, both sides are expected to accelerate the negotiation of the CoC on 
South China Sea and subsequently, a jointly developed regional security structure. However, 
China has yet to give a clear definition of this concept of community of common destiny so 
as to be a comprehensive political proposition. For instance, China may consider participating 
more actively in non-China centric regional issues to build up solid strategic credibility. 
Moreover, at the time of US rebalance to Asia, China would have to address its bilateral ties 
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with US in the context of Sino-ASEAN relationship. China has proposed the “New Model of 
Big Power Relations”, which asks for mutual respect of national interest and non-
confrontational behaviours. However, the US has not yet responded positively to this call.  
Therefore, in dealing with ASEAN related issues, China would have to be cautious so 
as to relieve suspicion from the US. All in all, China’s growth of comprehensive national 
strength together with the US rebalance in Asia has significantly changed the geo-political 
context in Southeast Asia. In the pursuit of a “Diamond Decade”, an upgraded bilateral 
relationship with ASEAN, China could not ignore these challenges and single-mindedly 
follow China’s predecessors’ regional vision. A new vision must be crafted. 
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